ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Testing network-based intrusion detection signatures using mutant exploits
Full text PdfPdf (197 KB)
Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington DC, USA
SESSION: Network intrusions table of contents
Pages: 21 - 30  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-961-6
Authors
Giovanni Vigna  University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
William Robertson  University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
Davide Balzarotti  Reliable Software Group and University of California, Santa Barbara, CA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 37,   Downloads (12 Months): 235,   Citation Count: 12
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
Save this Article to a Binder    Display Formats: BibTex  EndNote ACM Ref   
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1030083.1030088
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Misuse-based intrusion detection systems rely on models of attacks to identify the manifestation of intrusive behavior. Therefore, the ability of these systems to reliably detect attacks is strongly affected by the quality of their models, which are often called "signatures." A perfect model would be able to detect all the instances of an attack without making mistakes, that is, it would produce a 100% detection rate with 0 false alarms. Unfortunately, writing good models (or good signatures) is hard. Attacks that exploit a specific vulnerability may do so in completely different ways, and writing models that take into account all possible variations is very difficult. For this reason, it would be beneficial to have testing tools that are able to evaluate the "goodness" of detection signatures. This work describes a technique to test and evaluate misuse detection models in the case of network-based intrusion detection systems. The testing technique is based on a mechanism that generates a large number of variations of an exploit by applying mutant operators to an exploit template. These mutant exploits are then run against a victim host protected by a network-based intrusion detection system. The results of the systems in detecting these variations provide a quantitative basis for the evaluation of the quality of the corresponding detection model.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Anzen. nidsbench: A Network Intrusion Detection System Test Suite. http://packetstorm.widexs.nl/UNIX/IDS/nidsbench/, 1999.
 
2
S. Aubert. Idswakeup. http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/outils/idswakeup/, 2000.
 
3
W. Du and A. P. Mathur. Vulnerability Testing of Software System Using Fault Injection. Technical Report, COAST, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, US, April 1998.
4
5
 
6
 
7
C. Giovanni. Fun with Packets: Designing a Stick. http://www.eurocompton.net/stick/, 2002.
 
8
 
9
R. Marty. Thor: A Tool to Test Intrusion Detection Systems by Variations of Attacks. ETH Zurich Diploma Thesis, March 2002.
 
10
 
11
ISS. Realsecure 7.0. http://www.iss.net/, 2004.
 
12
 
13
K2. ADMmutate. http://www.ktwo.ca/security.html, 2004.
 
14
R. Lippmann, D. Fried, I. Graf, J. Haines, K. Kendall, D. McClung, D. Weber, S. Webster, D. Wyschogrod, R. Cunningham, and M. Zissman. Evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems: The 1998 DARPA Off-line Intrusion Detection Evaluation. In Proceedings of the DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, Volume 2, Hilton Head, SC, January 2000.
15
 
16
Metasploit Project. Metasploit. http://www.metasploit.com/, 2004.
 
17
 
18
Neohapsis OSEC Project. Neohapsis OSEC. http://osec.neohapsis.com/, 2004.
 
19
Netscape Communications Corporation. SSL 2.0 Protocol Specification. http://wp.netscape.com/eng/security/SSL_2.html, 1995.
 
20
Network Security Services Group. NSS IDS Evaluation (4th Edition). http://www.nss.co.uk/ips, 2004.
 
21
Network Working Group. Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification. http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2460.html, 1998.
 
22
Network Working Group. Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1. http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.html, 1999.
 
23
Next Generation Software Security Ltd. NGSS Evaluation. http://www.nextgenss.com/, 2004.
 
24
T.H. Ptacek and T.N. Newsham. Insertion, Evasion and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection. Technical Report, Secure Networks, January 1998.
 
25
R. J. Lipton R. A. DeMillo and F. G. Sayward. Hints on test data selection: Help for the practicing programmer. IEEE Computer, 11(4):34--43, 1978.
 
26
M. Ranum. Experience Benchmarking Intrusion Detection Systems. NFR Security White Paper, December 2001.
 
27
R. Graham. SideStep. http://www.robertgraham.com/tmp/sidestep.html, 2004.
 
28
 
29
D. Aitel. Sharefuzz. http://www.atstake.com/research/tools/vulnerability_scanning/, 2004.
 
30
Sniph. Snot. http://www.sec33.com/sniph/, 2001.
 
31
D. Aitel. Spike. http://www.immunitysec.com/resources/freesoftware.shtml, 2004.
 
32
The Apache HTTP Server Project. Apache HTTP Server. http://httpd.apache.org/, 2004.
 
33
The OpenSSL Project. OpenSSL. http://www.openssl.org/, 2004.
 
34

CITED BY  12
 
 
 
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Giovanni Vigna: colleagues
William Robertson: colleagues
Davide Balzarotti: colleagues