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Direct anonymous attestation
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Washington DC, USA
SESSION: Credentials table of contents
Pages: 132 - 145  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-961-6
Authors
Ernie Brickell  Intel Corporation
Jan Camenisch  IBM Research
Liqun Chen  HP Laboratories
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 35,   Downloads (12 Months): 184,   Citation Count: 17
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ABSTRACT

This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called Trusted Platform Module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. DAA can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of "known" keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  17
 
 
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Ernie Brickell: colleagues
Jan Camenisch: colleagues
Liqun Chen: colleagues