A variant of the Chaum voter-verifiable scheme

ABSTRACT

We present a variant of Chaum's voter verifiable election scheme that preserves the essential characteristics of the original whilst being significantly easier to understand and implement.The scheme provides voters with an encrypted receipt that they can use to check that their vote is entered into the tabulation. The scheme provides a high degree of transparency, within the constraints imposed by ballot secrecy. Various checks are performed by independent auditors and the voters themselves to catch any failure to decrypt receipts correctly. Thus assurance of accuracy is provided by close monitoring of the vote capture and processing, with minimal dependence on the voting devices and tellers.Assurance of secrecy is derived from multiple anonymising mixes of the ballot receipts.

REFERENCES

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