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Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem
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Source Symposium on Discrete Algorithms archive
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms table of contents
Vancouver, British Columbia
SESSION: Session 1B table of contents
Pages: 43 - 52  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:0-89871-585-7
Authors
James Aspnes  Yale University, New Haven, CT
Kevin Chang  Yale University, New Haven, CT
Aleksandr Yampolskiy  Yale University, New Haven, CT
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
: SIAM Activity Group on Discrete Mathematics
Publisher
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics  Philadelphia, PA, USA
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ABSTRACT

We propose a simple game for modeling containment of the spread of viruses in a graph of n nodes. Each node must choose to either install anti-virus software at some known cost C, or risk infection and a loss L if a virus that starts at a random initial point in the graph can reach it without being stopped by some intermediate node. The goal of individual nodes is to minimize their individual expected cost. We prove many game theoretic properties of the model, including an easily applied characterization of Nash equilibria, culminating in our showing that allowing selfish users to choose Nash equilibrium strategies is highly undesirable, because the price of anarchy is an unacceptable Θ(n) in the worst case. This shows in particular that a centralized solution can give a much better total cost than an equilibrium solution. Though it is NP-hard to compute such a social optimum, we show that the problem can be reduced to a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem that we call the sum-of-squares partition problem. Using a greedy algorithm based on sparse cuts, we show that this problem can be approximated to within a factor of O(log2 n), giving the same approximation ratio for the inoculation game.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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J. Aspnes, K. Chang, and A. Yampolskiy. Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem. Technical Report YALEU/DCS/TR-1295, Yale University, July 2004. Available at ftp://ftp.cs.yale.edu/pub/TR/tr1295.pdf.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
James Aspnes: colleagues
Kevin Chang: colleagues
Aleksandr Yampolskiy: colleagues