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Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
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Source Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, VA, USA
SESSION: Privacy and anonymity table of contents
Pages: 81 - 91  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-226-7
Authors
Xinyuan Wang  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Shiping Chen  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sushil Jajodia  George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Peer-to-peer VoIP calls are becoming increasingly popular due to their advantages in cost and convenience. When these calls are encrypted from end to end and anonymized by low latency anonymizing network, they are considered by many people to be both secure and anonymous.In this paper, we present a watermark technique that could be used for effectively identifying and correlating encrypted, peer-to-peer VoIP calls even if they are anonymized by low latency anonymizing networks. This result is in contrast to many people's perception. The key idea is to embed a unique watermark into the encrypted VoIP flow by slightly adjusting the timing of selected packets. Our analysis shows that it only takes several milliseconds time adjustment to make normal VoIP flows highly unique and the embedded watermark could be preserved across the low latency anonymizing network if appropriate redundancy is applied. Our analytical results are backed up by the real-time experiments performed on leading peer-to-peer VoIP client and on a commercially deployed anonymizing network. Our results demonstrate that (1) tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the Internet is feasible and (2) low latency anonymizing networks are susceptible to timing attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Xinyuan Wang: colleagues
Shiping Chen: colleagues
Sushil Jajodia: colleagues