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Verifiable audit trails for a versioning file system
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Source Workshop On Storage Security And Survivability archive
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability table of contents
Fairfax, VA, USA
SESSION: Short papers -- storage survivability table of contents
Pages: 44 - 50  
Year of Publication: 2005
ISBN:1-59593-233-X
Authors
Randal Burns  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Zachary Peterson  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Giuseppe Ateniese  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Stephen Bono  Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 7,   Downloads (12 Months): 76,   Citation Count: 1
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ABSTRACT

We present constructs that create, manage, and verify digital audit trails for versioning file systems. Based upon a small amount of data published to a third party, a file system commits to a version history. At a later date, an auditor uses the published data to verify the contents of the file system at any point in time. Audit trails create an analog of the paper audit process for file data, helping to meet the requirements of electronic record legislation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley. Our techniques address the I/O and computational efficiency of generating and verifying audit trails, the aggregation of audit information in directory hierarchies, and constructing verifiable audit trails in the presence of lost data.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Randal Burns: colleagues
Zachary Peterson: colleagues
Giuseppe Ateniese: colleagues
Stephen Bono: colleagues