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Lightweight, pollution-attack resistant multicast authentication scheme
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Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Taipei, Taiwan
SESSION: P2P & ad hoc networks table of contents
Pages: 148 - 156  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-272-0
Authors
Ya-Jeng Lin  National Chiao Tung University, University of California Berkeley, Hsinchu, Taiwan, ROC
Shiuhpyng Shieh  National Chiao Tung University, University of California Berkeley, Hsinchu, Taiwan, ROC
Warren W. Lin  National Chiao Tung University, University of California Berkeley, Hsinchu, Taiwan, ROC
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Authentication is an important security measure for multicast applications, providing receivers with confidence that the packets they receive are valid. Simply signing every multicast packet with a digital signature incurs high overhead; therefore, a scheme such as signature amortization helps reduce this overhead. To tolerate packet loss, erasure codes are employed to enhance signature amortization. However, the use of erasure codes introduces pollution attack, an attack in which the adversary injects packets to disrupt the erasure decoding procedure and consequently denies the authentication service to the receiver. Unfortunately, current solutions to pollution attack are computationally intensive and inefficient. To cope with this problem, we propose a new lightweight, pollution-attack resistant multicast authentication scheme (PARM), which generates evidence that receivers can validate on a fast, per-packet basis. This approach effectively resists pollution attacks and has better performance than previously proposed solutions.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Ya-Jeng Lin: colleagues
Shiuhpyng Shieh: colleagues
Warren W. Lin: colleagues