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Software integrity protection using timed executable agents
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Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Taipei, Taiwan
SESSION: Software security table of contents
Pages: 189 - 200  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-272-0
Authors
Juan A. Garay  Bell Labs -- Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ
Lorenz Huelsbergen  Bell Labs -- Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

We present a software scheme for protecting the integrity of computing platforms using Timed Executable Agent Systems (TEAS). A trusted challenger issues an authenticated challenge to a perhaps corrupt responder. New is that the issued challenge is an executable program that can potentially compute any function on the responder. The responder must compute not only the correct value implied by the agent, but also must complete this computation within time bounds prescribed by the challenger. Software-based attestation schemes have been proposed before---new capabilities introduced in TEAS provide means to mitigate the existing shortcomings of such proposed techniques. TEAS are general and can be adapted to many applications for which system integrity is to be tested.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Juan A. Garay: colleagues
Lorenz Huelsbergen: colleagues