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Impeding attrition attacks in P2P systems
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Source ACM SIGOPS European Workshop archive
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop table of contents
Leuven, Belgium
SESSION: Security table of contents
Article No. 12  
Year of Publication: 2004
Authors
Petros Maniatis  Intel Research, Berkeley, CA
TJ Giuli  Stanford University, CA
Mema Roussopoulos  Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
David S. H. Rosenthal  Stanford University Libraries, CA
Mary Baker  HP Labs, Palo Alto, CA
Sponsor
SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

P2P systems are exposed to an unusually broad range of attacks. These include a spectrum of denial-of-service, or attrition, attacks from low-level packet flooding to high-level abuse of the peer communication protocol. We identify a set of defenses that systems can deploy against such attacks and potential synergies among them. We illustrate the application of these defenses in the context of the LOCKSS digital preservation system.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Petros Maniatis: colleagues
TJ Giuli: colleagues
Mema Roussopoulos: colleagues
David S. H. Rosenthal: colleagues
Mary Baker: colleagues