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Trusted declassification:: high-level policy for a security-typed language
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Source Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation archive
Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security table of contents
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
SESSION: Secure information flow table of contents
Pages: 65 - 74  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-374-3
Authors
Boniface Hicks  Penn State University
Dave King  Penn State University
Patrick McDaniel  Penn State University
Michael Hicks  University of Maryland
Sponsors
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Security-typed languages promise to be a powerful tool with which provably secure software applications may be developed. Programs written in these languages enforce a strong, global policy of noninterferencewhich ensures that high-security data will not be observable on low-security channels. Because noninterference is typically too strong a property, most programs use some form of declassification to selectively leak high security information, e.g. when performing a password check or data encryption. Unfortunately, such a declassification is often expressed as an operation within a given program, rather than as part of a global policy, making reasoning about the security implications of a policy more difficult.In this paper, we propose a simple idea we call trusted declassification in which special declassifier functions are specified as part of the global policy. In particular, individual principals declaratively specify which declassifiers they trust so that all information flows implied by the policy can be reasoned about in absence of a particular program. We formalize our approach for a Java-like language and prove a modified form of noninterference which we call noninterference modulo trusted methods. We have implemented our approach as an extension to Jif and provide some of our experience using it to build a secure e-mail client.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Askarov, A., and Sabelfeld, A Secure implementation of cryptographic protocols: A case study of mutual distrust. In Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS '05) (Milan, Italy, September 2005), LNCS, Springer-Verlag.
 
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Broberg, N., and Sands, D. Flow locks: Towards a core calculus for dynamic flow policies. In Proceedings of ESOP'06, European Symposium on Programming (Vienna, Austria, March 2006), LNCS, Springer-Verlag.
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Chong, S., and Myers, A. C. Decentralized robustness. In Proceedings of the 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) (Venice, July 2006). to appear.
 
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Hicks, B., Ahmadizadeh, K., and McDaniel, P. From Languages to Systems: Understanding Practical Application Development in Security-typed Languages. Tech. Rep. NAS-TR-0035-2006, Network and Security Research Center, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA, April 2006.
 
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Hicks, B., King, D., McDaniel, P., and Hicks, M. Trusted declassification: High-level policy for a security-typed language. Tech. Rep. NAS-TR-0033-2006, Networking and Security Research Center, Department of Computer Science, Pennsylvania State University, March 2006.
 
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Hicks, M., Tse, S., Hicks, B., and Zdancewic, S. Dynamic updating of information-flow policies. In Proceedings of the Foundations of Computer Security Workshop (FCS '05) (March 2005).
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Mantel, H., and Sands, D. Controlled declassification based on intransitive noninterference. In Proceedings of the Asian Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems (Taipei, Taiwan, 2004), vol. 3302, Springer-Verlag, pp. 129--145.
 
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Myers, A. C., Nystrom, N., Zheng, L., and Zdancewic, S. Jif: Java + information flow. Software release. Located at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif, July 2001.
 
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Sabelfeld, A., and Myers, A. C. Language-based information-flow security. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 21, 1 January 2003, 5--19.
 
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Swamy, N., Hicks, M., Tse, S., and Zdancewic, S. Managing policy updates in security-typed languages, February 2006. Submitted for publication.
 
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Tse, S., and Zdancewic, S. A design for a security-typed language with certificate-based declassification. In Proc. of the 10th European Symposium on Programming (2005), Lecture Notes in Computer Science.


Collaborative Colleagues:
Boniface Hicks: colleagues
Dave King: colleagues
Patrick McDaniel: colleagues
Michael Hicks: colleagues