ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Web wallet: preventing phishing attacks by revealing user intentions
Full text PdfPdf (380 KB)
Source ACM International Conference Proceeding Series; Vol. 149 archive
Proceedings of the second symposium on Usable privacy and security table of contents
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
SESSION: Catching phish table of contents
Pages: 102 - 113  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-448-0
Authors
Min Wu  MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, Cambridge, MA
Robert C. Miller  MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, Cambridge, MA
Greg Little  MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab, Cambridge, MA
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 21,   Downloads (12 Months): 242,   Citation Count: 11
Additional Information:

abstract   references   cited by   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
Save this Article to a Binder    Display Formats: BibTex  EndNote ACM Ref   
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1143120.1143133
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

We introduce a new anti-phishing solution, the Web Wallet. The Web Wallet is a browser sidebar which users can use to submit their sensitive information online. It detects phishing attacks by determining where users intend to submit their information and suggests an alternative safe path to their intended site if the current site does not match it. It integrates security questions into the user's workflow so that its protection cannot be ignored by the user. We conducted a user study on the Web Wallet prototype and found that the Web Wallet is a promising approach. In the study, it significantly decreased the spoof rate of typical phishing attacks from 63% to 7%, and it effectively prevented all phishing attacks as long as it was used. A majority of the subjects successfully learned to depend on the Web Wallet to submit their login information. However, the study also found that spoofing the Web Wallet interface itself was an effective attack. Moreover, it was not easy to completely stop all subjects from typing sensitive information directly into web forms.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Adida, B., Hohenberger, S., Rivest, R. Lightweight Encryption for Email. USENIX Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet Workshop (SRUTI), 2005.
 
2
Anti-Phishing Working Group. Phishing Activity Trends Report, December 2005. http://antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_DEC2005_FINAL.pdf
 
3
Behera, P., Agarwal, N. A confidence model for web browsing. Toward a More Secure Web - W3C Workshop on Transparency and Usability of Web Authentication, 2006.
 
4
Cameron, K., Johns, M. Design Rationale behind the Identity Metasystem Architecture.2006. http://www.identityblog.com/wp-content/resources/design_rationale.pdf
5
 
6
Emigh, A. Online Identity Theft: Phishing Technology, Chokepoints and Countermeasure, ITTC Report on Online Identity Theft Technology and Countermeasures. October 3, 2005.
 
7
Emigh, A. Trusted Path in Heterogeneous Environments. 1st TIPPI Workshop, 2005.
 
8
FDIC. Putting an End to Account-Hijacking Identity Theft. 2004. http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/identity_theft.pdf
 
9
Felten, E. W., Balfanz, D., Dean, D., Wallach, D. S. Web Spoofing: An Internet Con Game. Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference, 1997
 
10
Fight Identity Theft Blog. ING Direct Fights Keystroke Loggers. December 11, 2005. http://fightidentitytheft.com/blog/?p=23
 
11
GeoTrust. TrustWatch Tools. http://www.trustwatch.com/
 
12
Herzberg, A. The 'Unprotected Login' Inter-Net Fraud League (I-NFL) Hall of Shame.2005. http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea//shame/
 
13
Herzberg, A. TrustBar: Re-establishing Trust in the Web. 2006. http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/TrustBar/
 
14
Jakobsson, M., Myers, S. Stealth Attacks and Delayed Password Disclosure. http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/markus/stealth-attacks.htm
 
15
Johns, M. A. Guide to Supporting InfoCard v1.0 Within Web Applications and Browsers. March, 2006. http://www.identityblog.com/?page_id=412#infocardg_topic5a
 
16
Krebs, B. The New Face of Phishing. The Washington Post. Feb 2006.
 
17
 
18
PassMark Security. Two-Factor Two-Way Authentication. http://www.passmarksecurity.com/
19
 
20
Ross, B., Jackson, C., Miyake, N., Boneh, D., Mitchell, J. Stronger Password Authentication Using Browser Extensions. Proceedings of the 14th Usenix Security Symposium, 2005.
 
21
Sharif, T. Phishing Filter in IE7, September 9, 2006. http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2005/09/09/463204.aspx
 
22
Treisman, A., Gormican, S. Feature analysis in early vision: Evidence from search asymmetries. Psychological Review, 95, 15--48. 1988.
 
23
W3C. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project. http://www.w3.org/P3P/
 
24
Wu, M. Fighting Phishing at the User Interface. PhD Thesis. MIT. 2006.
 
25
Wu, M., Garfinkel, S., Miller, R. Secure Web Authentication with Mobile Phones. DIMACS Workshop on Usable Privacy and Security Software, 2004.
26
 
27
 
28
Ye, E., Yuan Y., Smith, S. Web Spoofing Revisited: SSL and Beyond. Technical Report TR2002-417, 2002.

CITED BY  11
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Min Wu: colleagues
Robert C. Miller: colleagues
Greg Little: colleagues