Enforcing efficient resource provisioning in peer-to-peer file sharing systems

ABSTRACT

In this paper we focus on content availability as the main good provided by a p2p file sharing system and consider peer availability, the amount of time peers stay connected sharing their files, as their main contribution. We wish to study the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms which enforce contribution by somehow relating it with consumption. Towards this end, we propose a mechanism who wishes to regulate the time required for peers to stay on-line sharing their files by dictating a fixed upload throughput used by uploading peers and thus a certain average time for a download to finish. We formulate and analyze a suitable economic model focusing on peer availability in order to understand the role of this important system parameter and provide the means to efficiently tune it.

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INDEX TERMS

Primary Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.4 Distributed Systems

Additional Classification:
  C. Computer Systems Organization
  C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
      C.2.3 Network Operations
  C.4 PERFORMANCE OF SYSTEMS
      Subjects: Reliability, availability, and serviceability

  D. Software
  D.4 OPERATING SYSTEMS
      D.4.3 File Systems Management
          Subjects: Distributed file systems