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Negotiating efficient outcomes over multiple issues
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Source International Conference on Autonomous Agents archive
Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems table of contents
Hakodate, Japan
SESSION: Argumentation and negotiation table of contents
Pages: 423 - 425  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISBN:1-59593-303-4
Authors
Sabyasachi Saha  University of Tulsa
Sandip Sen  University of Tulsa
Sponsors
IFMAS : The International Foundation for Multiagent Systems
ATAL : The International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages
SIGART: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

It is difficult to reach optimal outcomes in bilateral negotiations with multiple issues when the agents' preferences and priorities of the issues are not common knowledge. Self-interested agents often end up negotiating inefficient agreements in such situations. Some existing multiagent negotiation frameworks involve agents revealing their preferences to a trusted mediator. But in real-life situations, such a third party, trusted by both the agents may not be found. We design a protocol for bilateral multi-issue negotiation. This protocol guarantees envy-free and Pareto optimal agreement with minimum revelation of their preferences when both negotiators are rational and have the same ordinal preferences. This protocol also leads rational agents to envy-free and near-optimal solution in all cases.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
S. J. Brams and A. D. Taylor. Fair Division. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
2
 
3
Y. In and R. Serrano. Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 53:385--399, 2004.
 
4
N. Jennings, P. Faratin, A. R. L. S. Parsons, C. Sierra, and M. Wooldridge. Automated negotiation: prospects, methods and challenges. International Journal of Group Decision and Negotiation, 10(2):199--215, 2001.
 
5
H. Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1982.
 
6
T. W. Sandholm. Contract types for satisficing task allocation: I theoretical results, AAAI Sprint Symposium, 1998.

Collaborative Colleagues:
Sabyasachi Saha: colleagues
Sandip Sen: colleagues