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Resource selection games with unknown number of players

Published: 08 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

In the context of pre-Bayesian games we analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in a game with strictly increasing linear cost functions every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. In order to perform the analysis we define safety-level equilibrium for pre-Bayesian games, and prove that it exists in a compact-continuous-concave setup; in particular it exists in a finite setup.

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cover image ACM Conferences
AAMAS '06: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
May 2006
1631 pages
ISBN:1595933034
DOI:10.1145/1160633
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Published: 08 May 2006

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  1. pre-bayesian games
  2. safety-level equilibrium

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