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On selfish routing in internet-like environments
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Source IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) archive
Volume 14 ,  Issue 4  (August 2006) table of contents
Pages: 725 - 738  
Year of Publication: 2006
ISSN:1063-6692
Authors
Lili Qiu  Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX
Yang Richard Yang  Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT
Yin Zhang  Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX
Scott Shenker  Computer Science Department, University of California, Berkeley, CA
Publisher
IEEE Press  Piscataway, NJ, USA
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DOI Bookmark: 10.1109/TNET.2006.880179

ABSTRACT

A recent trend in routing research is to avoid inefficiencies in network-level routing by allowing hosts to either choose routes themselves (e.g., source routing) or use overlay routing networks (e.g., Detour or RON). Such approaches result in selfish routing, because routing decisions are no longer based on system-wide criteria but are instead designed to optimize host-based or overlay-based metrics. A series of theoretical results showing that selfish routing can result in suboptimal system behavior have cast doubts on this approach. In this paper, we use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the performance of selfish routing in Internet-like environments based on realistic topologies and traffic demands in our simulations. We show that in contrast to theoretical worst cases, selfish routing achieves close to optimal average latency in such environments. However, such performance benefits come at the expense of significantly increased congestion on certain links. Moreover, the adaptive nature of selfish overlays can significantly reduce the effectiveness of traffic engineering by making network traffic less predictable.


REFERENCES

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Lili Qiu: colleagues
Yang Richard Yang: colleagues
Yin Zhang: colleagues
Scott Shenker: colleagues