ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
Lightweight cnsistency enforcement schemes for distributed proofs with hidden subtrees
Full text PdfPdf (365 KB)
Source
Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies table of contents
Sophia Antipolis, France
SESSION: Consistency enforcement and secure grids table of contents
Pages: 101 - 110  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-745-2
Authors
Adam J. Lee  University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign, Urbana, IL
Kazuhiro Minami  University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign, Urbana, IL
Marianne Winslett  University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign, Urbana, IL
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 3,   Downloads (12 Months): 57,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
Save this Article to a Binder    Display Formats: BibTex  EndNote ACM Ref   
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1266840.1266856
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

In distributed proof construction systems, information release policies can make it unlikely that any single node in the system is aware of the complete structure of any particular proof tree. This property makes it difficult for queriers to determine whether the proofs constructed using these protocols sampled a consistent snapshot of the system state; this has previously been shown to have dire consequences in decentralized authorization systems. Unfortunately, the consistency enforcement solutions presented in previous work were designed for systems in which only information encoded in certificates issued by certificate authorities is used during the decision-making process. Further, they assume that each piece of certified evidence used during proof construction is available to the decision-making node at runtime.

In this paper, we generalize these previous results and present lightweight mechanisms through which consistency constraints can be enforced in proof systems in which the full details of a proof may be unavailable to the querier and the existence of certificate authorities for certifying evidence is unlikely; these types of distributed proof systems are likely candidates for use in pervasive computing and sensor network environments. We present modifications to one such distributed proof system that enable two types of consistency constraints to be enforced while still respecting the same confidentiality and integrity policies as the original proof system. Further, we detail a performance analysis that illustrates the modest overheads of our consistency enforcement schemes.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
 
2
 
3
4
 
5
D. Balenson. Privacy enhancement for internet electronic mail: Part III: Algorithms, modes, and identifiers. IETF RFC 1423, Feb. 1993.
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
10
11
 
12
Data Encryption Standard (DES). Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 46-3, October 1999.
 
13
A. J. Lee, K. Minami, and M. Winslett. Lightweight consistency enforcement schemes for distributed proofs with hidden subtrees (extended version). Technical Report UIUCDCS-R-2007-2839, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Department of Computer Science, Apr. 2007.
14
15
16
 
17
 
18
K. Minami and D. Kotz. Scalability in a secure distributed proof system. In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Pervasive Computing(Pervasive), May 2006.
 
19
M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams. X.509 internet public key infrastructure online certificate status protocol - OCSP. IETF RFC2560, June 1999.
 
20
 
21
R. L. Rivest. The MD5 message-digest algorithm. IETF RFC 1321, Apr. 1992.
 
22
 
23
24
25
26

Collaborative Colleagues:
Adam J. Lee: colleagues
Kazuhiro Minami: colleagues
Marianne Winslett: colleagues