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Constructing arguments with a computational model of an argumentation scheme for legal rules: interpreting legal rules as reasoning policies
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International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law archive
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law table of contents
Stanford, California
SESSION: Modelling legal argument table of contents
Pages: 117 - 121  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-680-6
Author
Thomas F. Gordon  Fraunhofer FOKUS, Berlin, Germany
Sponsor
: International Association for Artificial Intelligence and Law
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

A knowledge representation language for defeasible legal rules is defined, whose semantics is purely procedural, based on Walton's theory of argumentation and Loui's break with the relational tradition in 'Process and Policy'. Legal rules are interpreted as reasoning policies, by mapping them in the semantics to argumentation schemes. The reasoning process is regulated by argumentation protocols. Reasoning with legal rules is viewed as applying schemes for arguments from rules to construct arguments to be put forward in dialogues.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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T. F. Gordon, H. Prakken, and D. Walton. The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof. Artificial Intelligence, 2007. In Press.
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R. P. Loui. Process and policy: resource-bounded non-demonstrative reasoning. Computational Intelligence, 14:1--38, 1998.
 
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J. Pollock. Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science, 11(4):481--518, 1987.
 
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H. Prakken and G. Sartor. A dialectical model of assessing conflicting argument in legal reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 4(3-4):331--368, 1996.
 
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J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
 
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D. Walton. Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation. Cambridge University Press, 2006.