ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
A random perturbation-based scheme for pairwise key establishment in sensor networks
Full text PdfPdf (305 KB)
Source
International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking & Computing archive
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing table of contents
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
SESSION: Sensor network security table of contents
Pages: 90 - 99  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-684-4
Authors
Wensheng Zhang  Iowa State University, Ames, IA
Minh Tran  Iowa State University, Ames, IA
Sencun Zhu  The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Guohong Cao  The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Sponsors
SIGMOBILE: ACM Special Interest Group on Mobility of Systems, Users, Data and Computing
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 34,   Downloads (12 Months): 247,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
Save this Article to a Binder    Display Formats: BibTex  EndNote ACM Ref   
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1288107.1288120
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

A prerequisite for secure communications between two sensor nodes is that these nodes exclusively share a pairwise key. Although numerous pairwise key establishment (PKE) schemes have been proposed in recent years, most of them have no guarantee for direct key establishment, no resilience to a large number of node compromises, no resilience to dynamic network topology, or high overhead. To address these limitations, we propose a novel random perturbation-based (RPB) scheme in this paper. The scheme guarantees that any two nodes can directly establish a pairwise key without exposing any secret to other nodes. Even after a large number of nodes have been compromised, the pairwise keys shared by non-compromised nodes remain highly secure. Moreover, the scheme adapts to changes in network topology and incurs low computation and communication overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the RPB scheme is the only one that provides all these salient features without relying on public key cryptography. Through prototype-based evaluation, we show that the RPB scheme is highly efficient and practical for current generation of sensor nodes. In particular, to support a sensor network with up to 216 nodes, establishing a pairwise key of 80 bits between any two 8-bit, 7.37-MHz MICA2 motes only requires about 0.13 second of CPU time, 0.33 KB RAM space, and 15 KB ROM space per node.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

1
2
3
 
4
5
6
7
 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11
S. Skorobogatov, "Low temperature data remanence in static ram," in University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Technical Report UCAM-CL-TR-536, June 2002.
 
12
 
13
"Cotsbots: The mobile mote-based robots," http://www-bsac.eecs.berkeley.edu/projects/cotsbots/.
14
 
15
W. Du, J. Deng, Y. Han, and S. Chen, "A key management scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment knowledge," IEEE INFOCOM'04, March 2004.
16
 
17
Haowen Chan and Adrian Perrig, "PIKE: Peer intermediaries for key establishment in sensor networks," in Proceedings of IEEE Infocom, Mar. 2005.
18
 
19
D. Malan, M. Welsh, and M. Smith, "A public-key infrastructure for key distribution in tinyos based on elliptic curve cryptography," First IEEE International Conference on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON), October 2004.
20
 
21
 
22
23
 
24
W. Zhang and G. Cao, "Group rekeying for filtering false data in sensor networks: A predistribution and local collaboration-based approach," IEEE Infocom 2005, March 2005.
 
25
"Crossbow technology inc," http://www.xbow.com 2004.
 
26
R. Rivest, "The rc5 encryption algorithm," in Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, 1994, pp. 86--96.
 
27
C. Karlof, N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner, "Tinysec: Tinyos link layer security proposal, version 1.0," 2002.
 
28
29
30

Collaborative Colleagues:
Wensheng Zhang: colleagues
Minh Tran: colleagues
Sencun Zhu: colleagues
Guohong Cao: colleagues