ACM Home Page
Please provide us with feedback. Feedback
An analysis of browser domain-isolation bugs and a light-weight transparent defense mechanism
Full text PdfPdf (421 KB)
Source
Conference on Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security table of contents
Alexandria, Virginia, USA
SESSION: Web applications security table of contents
Pages: 2 - 11  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-703-2
Authors
Shuo Chen  Microsoft, Redmond, WA
David Ross  Microsoft, Redmond, WA
Yi-Min Wang  Microsoft, Redmond, WA
Sponsors
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
Downloads (6 Weeks): 40,   Downloads (12 Months): 424,   Citation Count: 0
Additional Information:

abstract   references   index terms   collaborative colleagues  

Tools and Actions: Review this Article  
Save this Article to a Binder    Display Formats: BibTex  EndNote ACM Ref   
DOI Bookmark: Use this link to bookmark this Article: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1315245.1315248
What is a DOI?

ABSTRACT

Browsers' isolation mechanisms are critical to users' safety and privacy on the web. Achieving proper isolations, however, is very difficult. Historical data show that even for seemingly simple isolation policies, the current browser implementations are surprisingly error-prone. Isolation bugs have been exploited on most major browser products. This paper presents a focused study of browser isolation bugs and attacks. We found that because of the intrinsic complexity of browser components, it is impractical to exhaustively examine the browser implementation to eliminate these bugs. In this paper, we propose the script accenting mechanism as a light-weight transparent defense to enhance the current domain isolation mechanism. The basic idea is to introduce domain-specific "accents" to scripts and HTML object names so that two frames cannot communicate/interfere if they have different accents. The mechanism has been prototyped on Internet Explorer. Our evaluations showed that all known attacks were defeated, and the proposed mechanism is fully transparent to existing web applications. The measurement about end-to-end browsing time did not show any noticeable slowdown. We also argue that accenting could be a primitive that is general enough for implementing other domain-isolation policies.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
1
Firefox Cross-Frame Vulnerabilities. Security Focus Vulnerability Database. Bug IDs: 10877, 11177, 12465, 12884, 13231, 20042. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid
 
2
Opera Cross-Frame Vulnerabilities. Security Focus Vulnerability Database. Bug IDs: 3553, 4745, 6754, 8887, 10763. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid
 
3
Netscape Navigator Cross-Frame Vulnerabilities. Security Focus Vulnerability Database. Bug IDs: 11177, 13231. http://www.securityfocus.com/bid
 
4
A. Clover. CSS visited pages disclosure, 2002. http://seclists.org/lists/bugtraq/2002/Feb/0271.html.
 
5
Don Box. Essential COM. ISBN 0-201-63446-5. Addison Wesley.
 
6
 
7
Douglas Crockford. "JSONRequest," http://www.json.org/JSONRequest.html
8
 
9
J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer, "Security policies and security models," in Proc. 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
10
 
11
Martin Johns. "SessionSafe: Implementing XSS Immune Session Handling," in Proc. the 11th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Hamburg, Germany, September, 2006
 
12
MSDN Online. http://msdn.microsoft.com
 
13
The "Javascript:" Protocol. http://www.webreference.com/js/column35/protocol.html
 
14
 
15
 
16
The XMLHttpRequest Object. W3C Working Draft 27 September 2006. http://www.w3.org/TR/XMLHttpRequest/
 
17
Cross-site scripting. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross _site_scripting
 
18
Common Language Runtime (CLR). MSDN Online. http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/netframework/aa497266.aspx

Collaborative Colleagues:
Shuo Chen: colleagues
David Ross: colleagues
Yi-Min Wang: colleagues