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The Caernarvon secure embedded operating system
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ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review archive
Volume 42 ,  Issue 1  (January 2008) table of contents
SESSION: Systems work at IBM Research table of contents
Pages 32-39  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISSN:0163-5980
Authors
David C. Toll  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
Paul A. Karger  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
Elaine R. Palmer  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
Suzanne K. McIntosh  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
Sam Weber  IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY
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ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The Caernarvon operating system was developed to demonstrate that a high assurance system for smart cards was technically feasible and commercially viable. The entire system has been designed to be evaluated under the Common Criteria at EAL7, the highest defined level of assurance.

Historically, smart card processors have not supported the hardware protection features necessary to separate the OS from the applications, and one application from another. The Caernarvon OS has taken advantage of the first smart card processors with such features to be the first smart card OS to provide this kind of protection. Even when compared with conventional systems where the hardware protection is routine, the Caernarvon OS is noteworthy, because of the EAL7 assurance.

This approach facilitated implementation of a formally specified, mandatory security policy providing multi-level security (MLS) suitable for both government agencies and commercial users. The mandatory security policy requires effective authentication of its users that is independent of applications. For this reason, the Caernarvon OS also contains a privacy-preserving, two-way authentication protocol integrated with the Mandatory Security Policy.

The Caernarvon OS includes a strong cryptographic library that has been separately certified under the Common Criteria at EAL5+ for use with other systems. The Caernarvon OS implements a secure method for downloading trusted and untrusted application software and data in the field, with the assumption that all applications are potentially hostile. While the initial platform for the operating system was smart cards, the design could also be used in other embedded devices, such as USB tokens, PDAs, cell phones, etc.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
David C. Toll: colleagues
Paul A. Karger: colleagues
Elaine R. Palmer: colleagues
Suzanne K. McIntosh: colleagues
Sam Weber: colleagues