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False-name bids in combinatorial auctions

Published: 01 December 2007 Publication History

Abstract

In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses). If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a false-name bid. This article gives a brief introducion on false-name bids in combinatorial auctions.

References

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 7, Issue 1
December 2007
70 pages
EISSN:1551-9031
DOI:10.1145/1345037
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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 December 2007
Published in SIGECOM Volume 7, Issue 1

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Author Tags

  1. combinatorial auction
  2. mechanism design

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