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Practical defenses against BGP prefix hijacking
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Source International Conference On Emerging Networking Experiments And Technologies archive
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM CoNEXT conference table of contents
New York, New York
SESSION: Security table of contents
Article No. 3  
Year of Publication: 2007
ISBN:978-1-59593-770-4
Authors
Zheng Zhang  Purdue University
Ying Zhang  University of Michigan
Y. Charlie Hu  Purdue University
Z. Morley Mao  University of Michigan
Sponsors
IBM : IBM
: Alcatel-Lucent
: CISCO
: IMDEA
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
: Thomson
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

Prefix hijacking, a misbehavior in which a misconfigured or malicious BGP router originates an IP prefix that the router does not own, is becoming an increasingly serious security problem on the Internet. In this paper, we conduct a first comprehensive study on incrementally deployable mitigation solutions against prefix hijacking. We first propose a novel reactive detection-assisted solution based on the idea of bogus route purging and valid route promotion. Our simulations based on realistic settings show that purging bogus routes at 20 highest-degree ASes reduces the polluted portion of the Internet by a random prefix hijack from 50% down to 24%, and adding promotion further reduces the remaining pollution by 33% ~ 57%, We prove that our proposed route purging and promotion scheme preserve the convergence properties of BGP regardless of the number of promoters. We are the first to demonstrate that detection systems based on a limited number of BGP feeds are subject to detection evasion by hijackers. Motivated the need for proactive defenses to complement reactive mitigation response, we evaluate customer route filtering, a best common practice among large ISPs today, and show its limited effectiveness. We also show the added benefits of combining route purging-promotion with customer route filtering.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Z. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Y. C. Hu, and Z. M. Mao. Practical Defenses Against BGP Prefix Hijacking. Technical report, Purdue University, 2007. http://www.ece.purdue.edu/~zhang97/pub/prom.pdf.
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Zheng Zhang: colleagues
Ying Zhang: colleagues
Y. Charlie Hu: colleagues
Z. Morley Mao: colleagues