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A practical mimicry attack against powerful system-call monitors
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Tokyo, Japan
SESSION: Network security (I) table of contents
Pages 156-167  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-979-1
Authors
Chetan Parampalli  Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY
R. Sekar  Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY
Rob Johnson  Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

System-call monitoring has become the basis for many host-based intrusion detection as well as policy enforcement techniques. Mimicry attacks attempt to evade system-call monitoring IDS by executing innocuous-looking sequences of system calls that accomplish the attacker's goals. Mimicry attacks may execute a sequence of dozens of system calls in order to evade detection. Finding such a sequence is difficult, so researchers have focused on tools for automating mimicry attacks and extending them to gray-box IDS1. In this paper, we describe an alternative approach for building mimicry attacks using only skills and technologies that hackers possess today, making this attack a more immediate and realistic threat. These attacks, which we call persistent interposition attacks, are not as powerful as traditional mimicry attacks --- an adversary cannot obtain a root shell using a persistent interposition attack --- but are sufficient to accomplish the goals of today's cyber-criminals. Persistent interposition attacks are stealthier than standard mimicry attacks and are amenable to covert information-harvesting attacks, features that are likely to be attractive to profit-motivated criminals. Persistent interposition attacks are not IDS specific -- they can evade a large class of system-call-monitoring intrusion-detection systems, which we call I/O-data-oblivious. I/O-data-oblivious monitors have perfect knowledge of the values of all system call arguments as well as their relationships, with the exception of data buffer arguments to read and write. Many of today's black-box and gray-box IDS are I/O-data-oblivious and hence vulnerable to persistent interposition attacks.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
Chetan Parampalli: colleagues
R. Sekar: colleagues
Rob Johnson: colleagues