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Non-interactive conference key distribution and its applications
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Tokyo, Japan
SESSION: Key exchange table of contents
Pages 271-282  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-979-1
Authors
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini  University of Calgary
Shaoquan Jiang  University of Calgary
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
Bibliometrics
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ABSTRACT

A non-interactive conference key distribution system (or, a NICKDS for short) allows conference members to calculate a shared key without interacting with each other. NICKDSs have been studied in unconditional and computational settings. In both cases security has been evaluated against an adversary who can corrupt participants. In this paper we consider an adaptive adversary who can both corrupt participants and also access the keys of conference of his choice. We re-visit security of a number of known NICKDSs in this new model and present characterizations and conditions that guarantee security of the system in the new model. We also give a generic construction for computationally secure (in the new model) NICKDSs, from unconditionally secure ones in corruption only model.

To show the usefulness of the new security model, we consider two composition constructions. First, we compose a secure NICKDS with a secure MAC by using the key obtained from the NICKDS as the MAC key, and show that this results in a ring authentication that guarantees authenticity of the received message while the sender remains anonymous and this anonymity is unconditional. The security theorem for the composition guarantees security for unconditional and computational settings, both. We also consider composition of a NICKDS with a secure (CCA2 secure) encryption system and show this results in a broadcast encryption system (BES) that is CCA2 secure. This is the first CCA2 secure BES in symmetric key setting. We discuss future works and open problems.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Reihaneh Safavi-Naini: colleagues
Shaoquan Jiang: colleagues