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Provably secure browser-based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS
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Source ASIAN ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security archive
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security table of contents
Tokyo, Japan
SESSION: Protocols table of contents
Pages 300-311  
Year of Publication: 2008
ISBN:978-1-59593-979-1
Authors
Sebastian Gajek  Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Mark Manulis  Microelectronics Laboratory, Belgium
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi  Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Jörg Schwenk  Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Sponsor
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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ABSTRACT

The standard solution for user authentication on the Web is to establish a TLS-based secure channel in server authenticated mode and run a protocol on top of TLS where the user enters a password in an HTML form. However, as many studies point out, the average Internet user is unable to identify the server based on a X.509 certificate so that impersonation attacks (e.g., phishing) are feasible. We tackle this problem by proposing a protocol that allows the user to identify the server based on human perceptible authenticators (e.g., picture, voice). We prove the security of this protocol by refining the game-based security model of Bellare and Rogaway and present a proof of concept implementation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

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Collaborative Colleagues:
Sebastian Gajek: colleagues
Mark Manulis: colleagues
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi: colleagues
Jörg Schwenk: colleagues