research-article

Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets

Authors:

Heiner Ackermann,

Paul W. Goldberg,

Vahab S. Mirrokni,

Berthold VöckingAuthors Info & Claims

EC '08: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 256 - 263

https://doi.org/10.1145/1386790.1386831

Published: 08 July 2008 Publication History

Abstract

Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided markets. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings, introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is well known that stable matchings can be computed in polynomial time, but many real-life markets lack a central authority to match agents. In those markets, matchings are formed by actions of self-interested agents. Knuth introduced uncoordinated two-sided markets and showed that the uncoordinated better response dynamics may cycle. However, Roth and Vande Vate showed that the random better response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but did not address the question of convergence time.

In this paper, we give an exponential lower bound for the convergence time of the random better response dynamics in two-sided markets. We also extend the results for the better response dynamics to the best response dynamics, i.e., we present a cycle of best responses, and prove that the random best response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but its convergence time is exponential. Additionally, we identify the special class of correlated matroid two-sided markets with real-life applications for which we prove that the random best response dynamics converges in expected polynomial time.

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Cited By

Shah VFerguson BMarden J(2024)Learning Optimal Stable Matches in Decentralized Markets with Unknown Preferences2024 IEEE 63rd Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885928(787-792)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885928
Pais JPintér ÁVeszteg R(2019)Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experimentExperimental Economics10.1007/s10683-019-09606-1Online publication date: 1-Apr-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09606-1
Veski APõder K(2017)Zero-intelligence agents looking for a jobJournal of Economic Interaction and Coordination10.1007/s11403-017-0198-z13:3(615-640)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-017-0198-z
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Index Terms

Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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cover image ACM Conferences

EC '08: Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

July 2008

332 pages

ISBN:9781605581699

DOI:10.1145/1386790

General Chair:
Lance Fortnow
Northwestern University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
John Riedl
University of Minnesota, USA
,
Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie-Mellon University, USA

Copyright © 2008 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 08 July 2008

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July 8 - 12, 2008

Il, Chicago, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Shah VFerguson BMarden J(2024)Learning Optimal Stable Matches in Decentralized Markets with Unknown Preferences2024 IEEE 63rd Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885928(787-792)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC56724.2024.10885928
Pais JPintér ÁVeszteg R(2019)Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experimentExperimental Economics10.1007/s10683-019-09606-1Online publication date: 1-Apr-2019
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09606-1
Veski APõder K(2017)Zero-intelligence agents looking for a jobJournal of Economic Interaction and Coordination10.1007/s11403-017-0198-z13:3(615-640)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-017-0198-z
Mirrokni V(2016)Market Games and Content DistributionEncyclopedia of Algorithms10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_218(1189-1195)Online publication date: 22-Apr-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_218
Biró PNorman G(2012)Analysis of stochastic matching marketsInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-012-0352-842:4(1021-1040)Online publication date: 29-Oct-2012
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0352-8
Birnbaum BDevanur NXiao LShoham YChen YRoughgarden T(2011)Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher marketsProceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce10.1145/1993574.1993594(127-136)Online publication date: 5-Jun-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1993574.1993594
Celis LDevanur NPeres Y(2010)Local dynamics in bargaining networks via random-turn gamesProceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics10.5555/1940179.1940191(133-144)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1940179.1940191
Anshelevich EHoefer M(2010)Contribution games in social networksProceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I10.5555/1888935.1888954(158-169)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1888935.1888954
Anshelevich EDas S(2010)Matching, cardinal utility, and social welfareACM SIGecom Exchanges10.1145/1980534.19805389:1(1-7)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1980534.1980538
Celis LDevanur NPeres Y(2010)Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn GamesInternet and Network Economics10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_11(133-144)Online publication date: 2010
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_11
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