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Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition

Published: 12 May 2008 Publication History

Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

References

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E. Gerding, P. McBurney, J. Niu, S. Parsons, and S. Phelps. Overview of CAT: A market design competition. Technical Report ULCS-07-006, Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK, 2007. Version 1.1.
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  1. Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition

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    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    AAMAS '08: Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
    May 2008
    673 pages
    ISBN:9780981738116

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    In-Cooperation

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    International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

    Richland, SC

    Publication History

    Published: 12 May 2008

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    Author Tags

    1. double auction
    2. mechanism design
    3. trading agent competition

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    Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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