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Mathematical modeling of incentive policies in p2p systems

Published: 22 August 2008 Publication History

Abstract

In order to stimulate cooperation among nodes in P2P systems, some form of incentive mechanism is necessary so as to encourage service contribution. Hence, designing and evaluating the stability, robustness and performance of incentive policies is extremely critical. In this paper, we propose a general mathematical framework to evaluate the stability and evolution of a family of shared history based incentive policies. To illustrate the utility of the framework, we present two incentive policies and show why one incentive policy can lead to a total system collapse while the other is stable and operates at the optimal point. One can use this mathematical framework to design and analyze various incentive policies and verify whether they match the design objectives of the underlying P2P systems.

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M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica. Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems. In Workshop on Economics and Information Security, 2004.
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T. B. Ma, C. M. Lee, J. C. S. Lui, and K. Y. Yau. A Game Theoretic Approach to Provide Incentive and Service Differentiation in P2P Networks. In ACM Sigmetrics/IFIP Performance, June 2004.
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  • (2012)The Peer's DilemmaComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2012.08.01256:17(3756-3766)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2012
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cover image ACM Conferences
NetEcon '08: Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
August 2008
116 pages
ISBN:9781605581798
DOI:10.1145/1403027
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 22 August 2008

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Author Tags

  1. incentive
  2. learning
  3. peer-to-peer
  4. reciprocative
  5. stability
  6. strategy

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SIGCOMM '08
Sponsor:
SIGCOMM '08: ACM SIGCOMM 2008 Conference
August 22, 2008
WA, Seattle, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 10 of 18 submissions, 56%

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Cited By

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  • (2013)Advanced Detection of Selfish Vehicles for Local File Sharing in Sparse Vehicular NetworksIEEE Communications Letters10.1109/LCOMM.2013.040913.12278717:5(880-883)Online publication date: May-2013
  • (2012)Analysis and Evaluation Framework Based on Spatial Evolutionary Game Theory for Incentive Mechanism in Peer-to-Peer NetworkProceedings of the 2012 IEEE 11th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications10.1109/TrustCom.2012.86(287-294)Online publication date: 25-Jun-2012
  • (2012)The Peer's DilemmaComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2012.08.01256:17(3756-3766)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2012
  • (2011)Punishment or rewardProceedings of the 8th international conference on Ubiquitous intelligence and computing10.5555/2035646.2035667(197-208)Online publication date: 2-Sep-2011
  • (2011)Epidemic Live StreamingStreaming Media Architectures, Techniques, and Applications10.4018/978-1-61692-831-5.ch013(311-336)Online publication date: 2011
  • (2011)On the effectiveness of service differentiation based resource-provision incentive mechanisms in dynamic and autonomous P2P networksComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2011.07.01155:17(3811-3831)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2011
  • (2011)P2P soft securityComputer Communications10.1016/j.comcom.2010.01.02134:3(241-249)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2011
  • (2011)Incentive mechanism for selfish nodes in wireless sensor networks based on evolutionary gameComputers & Mathematics with Applications10.1016/j.camwa.2011.08.05262:9(3378-3388)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2011
  • (2011)Punishment or Reward: It Is a Problem in Anonymous, Dynamic and Autonomous Networking EnvironmentsUbiquitous Intelligence and Computing10.1007/978-3-642-23641-9_18(197-208)Online publication date: 2011
  • (2010)P2P trading in social networksProceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications10.5555/1833515.1833839(2489-2497)Online publication date: 14-Mar-2010
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