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Open problems in the security of learning

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Published:27 October 2008Publication History

ABSTRACT

Machine learning has become a valuable tool for detecting and preventing malicious activity. However, as more applications employ machine learning techniques in adversarial decision-making situations, increasingly powerful attacks become possible against machine learning systems. In this paper, we present three broad research directions towards the end of developing truly secure learning. First, we suggest that finding bounds on adversarial influence is important to understand the limits of what an attacker can and cannot do to a learning system. Second, we investigate the value of adversarial capabilities-the success of an attack depends largely on what types of information and influence the attacker has. Finally, we propose directions in technologies for secure learning and suggest lines of investigation into secure techniques for learning in adversarial environments. We intend this paper to foster discussion about the security of machine learning, and we believe that the research directions we propose represent the most important directions to pursue in the quest for secure learning.

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        • Published in

          cover image ACM Conferences
          AISec '08: Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Workshop on AISec
          October 2008
          84 pages
          ISBN:9781605582917
          DOI:10.1145/1456377

          Copyright © 2008 ACM

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          Publication History

          • Published: 27 October 2008

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          AISec '08 Paper Acceptance Rate9of20submissions,45%Overall Acceptance Rate94of231submissions,41%

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