ABSTRACT
Measuring the effectiveness of proposed black box correlation attacks against deployed anonymous networks is not feasible. This results in not being able to measure the effectiveness of defensive techniques, or performance enhancements with respect to anonymity. To overcome this problem, a discrete, event-based network simulation of the Tor anonymous network is developed. The simulation is validated against traffic transmitted through the real Tor network and the scalability of the simulation is measured. Simulations with up to 16,000 clients were run, upon which several attacks are implemented thus allowing for a measure of anonymity. Experimental defensive techniques are tested with corresponding anonymity measured.
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Index Terms
- Simulating low-latency anonymous networks
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