Jens Grossklags
Svetlana Radosavac
ABSTRACT
By employing an interdependent security game-theoretic framework, we study how individual Internet Service Providers can coordinate the investment decisions of end users to improve the security of the overall system. We study two different forms of intervention: rebates in combination with penalties (pay for outcome) and costsubsidies (pay for effort).
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Index Terms
- Nudge: intermediaries' role in interdependent network security
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