Achieving attestation with less effort: an indirect and configurable approach to integrity reporting

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes an indirect attestation paradigm for verifying the trustworthiness of end user platforms. This approach overcomes several criticisms of attestation by maintaining the user's freedom to choose their own software configurations and minimising the whitelist management overhead for the relying party. Each user platform defines its own acceptable software combination in terms of reference integrity measurements, and reports the local verification results to the relying party through a late-launched, trusted Platform Trust Service. The relying party simply checks this verification result and a security meta-policy that has been used to ensure the quality of the security checks performed locally. The Platform Trust Service is also responsible for reporting whether this meta-policy is satisfied. By configuring the meta-policy, the relying party selects an indirect attestation paradigm that best meets their high-level security requirements.

References

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Index Terms

• Security and privacy

  • Systems security

    • Operating systems security

• Social and professional topics

  • Computing / technology policy

    • Computer crime