Mahdi N. Al-Ameen
ABSTRACT
P2P systems are inherently vulnerable to Sybil attacks, in which an attacker can have a large number of identities and use them to control a substantial fraction of the system. We propose Persea, a novel P2P system that is more robust against Sybil attacks than prior approaches. Persea derives its Sybil resistance by assigning IDs through a bootstrap tree, the graph of how nodes have joined the system through invitations. More specifically, a node joins Persea when it gets an invitation from an existing node in the system. The inviting node assigns a node ID to the joining node and gives it a chunk of node IDs for further distribution. For each chunk of ID space, the attacker needs to socially engineer a connection to another node already in the system. This hierarchical distribution of node IDs confines a large attacker botnet to a considerably smaller region of the ID space than in a normal P2P system. Persea uses a replication mechanism in which each (key,value) pair is stored in nodes that are evenly spaced over the network. Thus, even if a given region is occupied by attackers, the desired (key,value) pair can be retrieved from other regions. We compare our results with Kad, Whanau, and X-Vine and show that Persea is a better solution against Sybil attacks.
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Index Terms
- Persea: a sybil-resistant social DHT
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