skip to main content
10.1145/2486001.2486010acmconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagescommConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article
Free access

BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?

Published: 27 August 2013 Publication History

Abstract

As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in "partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits provided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when these popular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routing policies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system.

References

[1]
IRR power tools. http://sourceforge.net/projects/irrpt/, 2011.
[2]
Working group 6 Secure BGP Deployment Report. Technical report, FCC CSRIC http://transition.fcc.gov/bureaus/pshs/advisory/csric3/CSRICIII_9-12-12_WG6-Final-Report.pdf, 2012.
[3]
B. Ager, N. Chatzis, A. Feldmann, N. Sarrar, S. Uhlig, and W. Willinger. Anatomy of a large european IXP. In SIGCOMM'12, 2012.
[4]
Alexa. The top 500 sites on the web. http://www.alexa.com/topsites, October 1 2012.
[5]
B. Augustin, B. Krishnamurthy, and W. Willinger. IXPs: Mapped? In IMC'09, 2009.
[6]
I. Avramopoulos, M. Suchara, and J. Rexford. How small groups can secure interdomain routing. Technical report, Princeton University Comp. Sci., 2007.
[7]
H. Ballani, P. Francis, and X. Zhang. A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the Internet. In SIGCOMM'07, 2007.
[8]
A. Boldyreva and R. Lychev. Provable security of S-BGP and other path vector protocols: model, analysis and extensions. In CCS'12, pages 541--552.
[9]
M. A. Brown. Rensys Blog: Pakistan hijacks YouTube. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2008/02/pakistan_hijacks_youtube_1.shtml.
[10]
K. Butler, T. Farley, P. McDaniel, and J. Rexford. A survey of BGP security issues and solutions. Proceedings of the IEEE, 2010.
[11]
H. Chang, D. Dash, A. Perrig, and H. Zhang. Modeling adoptability of secure BGP protocol. In SIGCOMM'06, 2006.
[12]
Y.-J. Chi, R. Oliveira, and L. Zhang. Cyclops: The Internet AS-level observatory. SIGCOMM CCR, 2008.
[13]
Cisco. BGP best path selection algorithm: How the best path algorithm works. Document ID: 13753, May 2012. http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk365/technologies_tech_note09186a0080094431.shtml#bestpath.
[14]
J. Cowie. Rensys blog: China's 18-minute mystery. http://www.renesys.com/blog/2010/11/chinas-18-minute-mystery.shtml.
[15]
A. Dhamdhere and C. Dovrolis. Twelve years in the evolution of the internet ecosystem. Trans. Netw., 19(5):1420--1433, 2011.
[16]
L. Gao, T. Griffin, and J. Rexford. Inherently safe backup routing with BGP. IEEE INFOCOM, 2001.
[17]
L. Gao and J. Rexford. Stable Internet routing without global coordination. Trans. Netw., 2001.
[18]
P. Gill, S. Goldberg, and M. Schapira. A survey of interdomain routing policies. NANOG'56, October 2012.
[19]
P. Gill, M. Schapira, and S. Goldberg. Let the market drive deployment: A strategy for transistioning to BGP security. SIGCOMM'11, 2011.
[20]
S. Goldberg, S. Halevi, A. D. Jaggard, V. Ramachandran, and R. N. Wright. Rationality and traffic attraction: Incentives for honest path announcements in BGP. In SIGCOMM'08, 2008.
[21]
S. Goldberg, M. Schapira, P. Hummon, and J. Rexford. How secure are secure interdomain routing protocols? In SIGCOMM'10, 2010.
[22]
T. Griffin and G. Huston. BGP wedgies. RFC 4264, 2005.
[23]
T. Griffin, F. B. Shepherd, and G. Wilfong. The stable paths problem and interdomain routing. Trans. Netw., 2002.
[24]
G. Huston. Peering and settlements - Part I. The Internet Protocol Journal (Cisco), 2(1), March 1999.
[25]
G. Huston. Peering and settlements - Part II. The Internet Protocol Journal (Cisco), 2(2), June 1999.
[26]
S. Kent and A. Chi. Threat model for BGP path security. Internet draft: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-04, 2013.
[27]
S. Kent, C. Lynn, and K. Seo. Secure border gateway protocol (S-BGP). JSAC, 2000.
[28]
C. Labovitz. Arbor blog: Battle of the hyper giants. http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/04/ the-battle-of-the-hyper-giants-part-i-2/.
[29]
C. Labovitz. Internet traffic 2007 - 2011. Global Peering Forum. Santi Monica, CA., April 2011.
[30]
C. Labovitz, S. Iekel-Johnson, D. McPherson, J. Oberheide, and F. Jahanian. Internet inter-domain traffic. In SIGCOMM'10, 2010.
[31]
M. Lepinski. Bgpsec protocol specification: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-06. Internet-Draft, 2012.
[32]
M. Lepinski and S. Kent. RFC 6480: An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing.
[33]
R. Lychev, S. Goldberg, and M. Schapira. Network destabilizing attacks. In PODC'12, 2012.
[34]
R. Lychev, S. Goldberg, and M. Schapira. Is the juice worth the squeeze? BGP security in partial deployment. Technical report, Arxiv, 2013.
[35]
P. McDaniel, W. Aiello, K. Butler, and J. Ioannidis. Origin authentication in interdomain routing. Computer Networks, November 2006.
[36]
S. Misel. "Wow, AS7007!". Merit NANOG Archive, April 1997. http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/ 1997-04/msg00340.html.
[37]
P. Mohapatra, J. Scudder, D. Ward, R. Bush, and R. Austein. BGP Prefix Origin Validation. Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, 2012. http://tools.ietf.org/html/ draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-09.
[38]
P. Palse. Serving ROAs as RPSL route{6} Objects from the RIPE Database. RIPE Labs, June 2010. https://labs.ripe.net/Members/Paul_P_/content-serving-roas-rpsl-route-objects.
[39]
T. Paseka. Cloudflare blog: Why google went offline today., November 2012. http://blog.cloudflare.com/why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about.
[40]
A. Pilosov and T. Kapela. Stealing the Internet: An Internet-scale man in the middle attack, 2008. DEFCON'16.
[41]
Reuters. Internet providers pledge anti-botnet effort, March 22 2012.
[42]
M. Roughan, W. Willinger, O. Maennel, D. Perouli, and R. Bush. 10 lessons from 10 years of measuring and modeling the internet?s autonomous systems. JSAC, 29(9):1810--1821, 2011.
[43]
R. Sami, M. Schapira, and A. Zohar. Searching for stability in interdomain routing. In INFOCOM'09, 2009.
[44]
Sandvine. Fall 2012 global internet phenomena, 2012.
[45]
K. Sriram. BGPSEC design choices and summary of supporting discussions. Internet-Draft: draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-03, January 2013.
[46]
R. White. Deployment considerations for secure origin BGP (soBGP). draft-white-sobgp-bgp-deployment-01.txt, June 2003, expired.

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)RPKI Defense Capability Simulation Method Based on Container VirtualizationApplied Sciences10.3390/app1418840814:18(8408)Online publication date: 18-Sep-2024
  • (2024)Internet Architecture Evolution: Found in TranslationProceedings of the 23rd ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3696348.3696876(300-307)Online publication date: 18-Nov-2024
  • (2023)Physical Deployability MattersProceedings of the 22nd ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3626111.3628190(9-17)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2023
  • Show More Cited By

Index Terms

  1. BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Conferences
    SIGCOMM '13: Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
    August 2013
    580 pages
    ISBN:9781450320566
    DOI:10.1145/2486001
    • cover image ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
      ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review  Volume 43, Issue 4
      October 2013
      595 pages
      ISSN:0146-4833
      DOI:10.1145/2534169
      Issue’s Table of Contents
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

    Sponsors

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 27 August 2013

    Permissions

    Request permissions for this article.

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. bgp
    2. partial deployment
    3. routing
    4. security

    Qualifiers

    • Research-article

    Conference

    SIGCOMM'13
    Sponsor:
    SIGCOMM'13: ACM SIGCOMM 2013 Conference
    August 12 - 16, 2013
    Hong Kong, China

    Acceptance Rates

    SIGCOMM '13 Paper Acceptance Rate 38 of 246 submissions, 15%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 462 of 3,389 submissions, 14%

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)206
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)58
    Reflects downloads up to 20 Feb 2025

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2024)RPKI Defense Capability Simulation Method Based on Container VirtualizationApplied Sciences10.3390/app1418840814:18(8408)Online publication date: 18-Sep-2024
    • (2024)Internet Architecture Evolution: Found in TranslationProceedings of the 23rd ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3696348.3696876(300-307)Online publication date: 18-Nov-2024
    • (2023)Physical Deployability MattersProceedings of the 22nd ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks10.1145/3626111.3628190(9-17)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2023
    • (2023)Beyond Limits: How to Disable Validators in Secure NetworksProceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2023 Conference10.1145/3603269.3604861(950-966)Online publication date: 10-Sep-2023
    • (2023)The Juice Is Worth the Squeeze: Analysis of Autonomous System Provider Authorization in Partial DeploymentIEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society10.1109/OJCOMS.2022.32338334(269-306)Online publication date: 2023
    • (2023)Enabling Security Research Through Efficient Partial Deployment Topology Configuration and ValidationIEEE INFOCOM 2023 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)10.1109/INFOCOMWKSHPS57453.2023.10226052(1-6)Online publication date: 20-May-2023
    • (2022)Path stability in partially deployed secure BGP routingComputer Networks10.1016/j.comnet.2022.108762206(108762)Online publication date: Apr-2022
    • (2022)RouteInfer: Inferring Interdomain Paths by Capturing ISP Routing Behavior Diversity and GeneralityPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-030-98785-5_10(216-244)Online publication date: 22-Mar-2022
    • (2021)Securing internet applications from routing attacksCommunications of the ACM10.1145/342977564:6(86-96)Online publication date: 24-May-2021
    • (2021)Routing and AddressingFuture Networks, Services and Management10.1007/978-3-030-81961-3_10(289-307)Online publication date: 25-Nov-2021
    • Show More Cited By

    View Options

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Login options

    Figures

    Tables

    Media

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media