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Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization

Published: 01 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

We consider auction settings where the seller is constrained in the amount and nature of information he may reveal about the good being sold. This is encountered, for example, in online advertising auctions, where communicating precise details of every viewer to interested advertisers is impractical, costly, and possibly socially undesirable. We initiate the study of constrained signaling in such settings, where a seller must choose which information to reveal subject to exogenous constraints on the signaling policy. We consider a seller employing the second-price auction, and present algorithms and hardness results for approximating the welfare and revenue maximizing signaling policies under a variety of constraints.

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Cited By

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  • (2019)Strategic signaling for selling information goodsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367037(25-31)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
  • (2019)Optimal bundles for sponsored search auctions via bracketing schemeFrontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities10.1007/s11704-017-6102-013:2(333-342)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2019
  • (2019)Hardness of Approximation Between P and NPundefinedOnline publication date: 30-May-2019
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  1. Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization

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    Published In

    cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
    ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 12, Issue 1
    June 2013
    56 pages
    EISSN:1551-9031
    DOI:10.1145/2509013
    Issue’s Table of Contents

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    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 01 June 2013
    Published in SIGECOM Volume 12, Issue 1

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    Author Tags

    1. auctions
    2. mechanism design
    3. signaling

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    View all
    • (2019)Strategic signaling for selling information goodsProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3367032.3367037(25-31)Online publication date: 10-Aug-2019
    • (2019)Optimal bundles for sponsored search auctions via bracketing schemeFrontiers of Computer Science: Selected Publications from Chinese Universities10.1007/s11704-017-6102-013:2(333-342)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2019
    • (2019)Hardness of Approximation Between P and NPundefinedOnline publication date: 30-May-2019
    • (2017)Strategic Free Information Disclosure for a Vickrey AuctionAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_1(1-18)Online publication date: 24-Feb-2017
    • (2014)Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad matchProceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation10.1145/2600057.2602828(39-56)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2014

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