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Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets

Published: 01 June 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We consider a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents arrive and depart asynchronously. As a result, it is possible that an agent on one side of the market (a "buyer") identifies an agent on the other side of the market (a "seller") who is a suitable match, only to find that the seller is already matched. We find using a mean field approach that lack of knowledge about availability can create large welfare losses to both buyers and sellers. We consider a simple intervention available to the platform: limiting visibility of sellers. We find that this intervention can significantly improve the welfare of agents on both sides of the market; sellers pay lower application costs, while buyers are less likely to find that the sellers they screen have already matched. Somewhat counterintuitively, the benefits of showing fewer sellers to each buyer are greatest in markets in which there is a shortage of sellers.

Cited By

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  • (2023)Double auctions with two-sided bandit feedbackProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3666290(3841-3852)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
  • (2022)Exchange Networks with Stochastic MatchingGames10.3390/g1401000214:1(2)Online publication date: 27-Dec-2022
  • (2022)Parameterized approximations for the two-sided assortment optimizationOperations Research Letters10.1016/j.orl.2022.04.002Online publication date: May-2022
  • Show More Cited By

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  1. Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    EC '14: Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation
    June 2014
    1028 pages
    ISBN:9781450325653
    DOI:10.1145/2600057
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 01 June 2014

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    Author Tags

    1. decentralized
    2. market design
    3. matching
    4. mean field

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    EC '14
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    EC '14: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
    June 8 - 12, 2014
    California, Palo Alto, USA

    Acceptance Rates

    EC '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 290 submissions, 28%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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    Cited By

    View all
    • (2023)Double auctions with two-sided bandit feedbackProceedings of the 37th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3666122.3666290(3841-3852)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
    • (2022)Exchange Networks with Stochastic MatchingGames10.3390/g1401000214:1(2)Online publication date: 27-Dec-2022
    • (2022)Parameterized approximations for the two-sided assortment optimizationOperations Research Letters10.1016/j.orl.2022.04.002Online publication date: May-2022
    • (2021)Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked MarketsManufacturing & Service Operations Management10.1287/msom.2019.085323:3(569-588)Online publication date: 1-May-2021
    • (2021)Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching PlatformsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2020.379467:10(5990-6029)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2021
    • (2020)Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching GamesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/33737177:4(1-30)Online publication date: 30-Jan-2020
    • (2020)Pricing Multi-Unit MarketsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/33737157:4(1-29)Online publication date: 30-Jan-2020
    • (2020)Incentivizing Deep Fixes in Software EconomiesIEEE Transactions on Software Engineering10.1109/TSE.2018.284218846:1(51-70)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2020
    • (2019)Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match RecommendationsManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265Online publication date: 7-Aug-2019
    • (2019)Buyer Uncertainty About Seller CapacityManagement Science10.1287/mnsc.2018.311665:8(3518-3540)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2019
    • Show More Cited By

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