skip to main content
10.1145/2600176.2600177acmotherconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PageshotsosConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

In-nimbo sandboxing

Published:08 April 2014Publication History

ABSTRACT

Sandboxes impose a security policy, isolating applications and their components from the rest of a system. While many sandboxing techniques exist, state of the art sandboxes generally perform their functions within the system that is being defended. As a result, when the sandbox fails or is bypassed, the security of the surrounding system can no longer be assured. We experiment with the idea of in-nimbo sandboxing, encapsulating untrusted computations away from the system we are trying to protect. The idea is to delegate computations that may be vulnerable or malicious to virtual machine instances in a cloud computing environment.

This may not reduce the possibility of an in-situ sandbox compromise, but it could significantly reduce the consequences should that possibility be realized. To achieve this advantage, there are additional requirements, including: (1) A regulated channel between the local and cloud environments that supports interaction with the encapsulated application, (2) Performance design that acceptably minimizes latencies in excess of the in-situ baseline.

To test the feasibility of the idea, we built an in-nimbo sandbox for Adobe Reader, an application that historically has been subject to significant attacks. We undertook a prototype deployment with PDF users in a large aerospace firm. In addition to thwarting several examples of existing PDF-based malware, we found that the added increment of latency, perhaps surprisingly, does not overly impair the user experience with respect to performance or usability.

References

  1. AppDB Adobe Reader. http://goo.gl/Fx9pd.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  2. Chromium sandbox. http://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/sandbox/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  3. National vulnerability database (NVD) national vulnerability database (CVE-2010-3019). http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3019.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  4. National vulnerability database (NVD) national vulnerability database (CVE-2013-0768). http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-0768.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  5. PDF x-RAY. https://github.com/9b/pdfxray_public.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  6. What is protected view? - word - office.com. http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/word-help/what-is-protected-view-HA010355931.aspx.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  7. PDF Reference, sixth edition ed. Adobe Systems Incorporated, Nov. 2006.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  8. Two new vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat Reader. http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001671.html, Apr. 2009.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  9. Anatomy of a malicious PDF file. http://goo.gl/VlLmU, Feb. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  10. Military targets. http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002203.html, July 2011.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  11. National vulnerability database (NVD) national vulnerability database (CVE-2011-2949). http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-2949, Oct. 2011.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  12. Understanding and working in protected mode internet explorer. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb250462(v=vs.85).aspx, Feb. 2011.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  13. 4.8.11 the canvas element - HTML5. http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/the-canvas-element.html#the-canvas-element, Mar. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  14. Adobe PDF library SDK | adobe developer connection. http://www.adobe.com/devnet/pdf/library.html, Aug. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  15. Google warns of using adobe reader - particularly on linux. http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/Google-warns-of-using-Adobe-Reader-particularly-on-Linux-1668153.html, Aug. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  16. National vulnerability database (NVD) national vulnerability database (CVE-2010-2937). http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-2937, Jan. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  17. Arkin, Brad. Illegal access to Adobe source code. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2013/10/illegal-access-to-adobe-source-code.html, Oct. 2013.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  18. Buchanan, K., Evans, C., Reis, C., and Sepez, T. Chromium blog: A tale of two pwnies (Part 2). http://blog.chromium.org/2012/06/tale-of-two-pwnies-part-2.html, June 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  19. Clarkson, M. R., and Schneider, F. B. Hyperproperties. Journal of Computer Security 18, 6 (2010), 1157--1210. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  20. Delugre, G. Bypassing ASLR and DEP on Adobe Reader X - Sogeti ESEC Lab. http://esec-lab.sogeti.com/post/Bypassing-ASLR-and-DEP-on-Adobe-Reader-X, June 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  21. Esparza, J. peepdf - PDF analysis and creation/modification tool. http://code.google.com/p/peepdf/.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  22. Fratantonio, Y., Kruegel, C., and Vigna, G. Shellzer: a tool for the dynamic analysis of malicious shellcode. In Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011), RAID'11, Springer-Verlag, pp. 61--80. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  23. Friedl, S. Best practices for UNIX chroot() operations. http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/chroot-practices.html.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  24. Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., and Boneh, D. Terra: A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (New York, NY, USA, 2003), SOSP '03, ACM, pp. 193--206. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  25. Goodin, D. At hacking contest, Google Chrome falls to third zero-day attack (Updated). http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/03/googles-chrome-browser-on-friday.ars, Mar. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  26. Hamlen, K. W., Morrisett, G., and Schneider, F. B. Computability classes for enforcement mechanisms. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) 28, 1 (2006), 175--205. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  27. Higgins, K. Spear-phishing attacks out of China targeted source code, intellectual property. http://goo.gl/8RzyT, Jan. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  28. International Organization for Standardization, I. ISO 15929:2002 - International Organization for Standardization. http://goo.gl/SUP1A.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  29. International Organization for Standardization, I. ISO 19005-2:2011 - International Organization for Standardization. http://goo.gl/mtHWw.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  30. International Organization for Standardization, I. ISO 32000-1:2008 - International Organization for Standardization.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  31. Jana, S., Porter, D. E., and Shmatikov, V. TxBox: Building secure, efficient sandboxes with system transactions. In 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) (May 2011), IEEE, pp. 329--344. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  32. Landesman, M. Free PDF readers: Alternatives to Adobe Reader and Acrobat. http://antivirus.about.com/od/securitytips/tp/Free-Pdf-Readers-Alternatives-To-Adobe-Reader-Acrobat.htm.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  33. Laskov, P., and Srndic, N. Static detection of malicious JavaScript-bearing PDF documents. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (New York, NY, USA, 2011), ACSAC '11, ACM, pp. 373--382. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  34. Maiorca, D., Corona, I., and Giacinto, G. Looking at the bag is not enough to find the bomb: An evasion of structural methods for malicious PDF files detection. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (New York, NY, USA, 2013), ASIA CCS '13, ACM, pp. 119--130. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  35. Maiorca, D., Giacinto, G., and Corona, I. A pattern recognition system for malicious PDF files detection. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Machine Learning and Data Mining in Pattern Recognition (Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012), MLDM'12, Springer-Verlag, pp. 510--524. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  36. Mantel, H. On the composition of secure systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2002 (2002), IEEE, pp. 88--101. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  37. Martignoni, L., Poosankam, P., Zaharia, M., Han, J., McCamant, S., Song, D., Paxson, V., Perrig, A., Shenker, S., and Stoica, I. Cloud Terminal: Secure access to sensitive applications from untrusted systems. In Proceedings of the 2012 USENIX conference on Annual Technical Conference (Berkeley, CA, USA, 2012), USENIX ATC'12, USENIX Association, pp. 14--14. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  38. McCune, J. M., Li, Y., Qu, N., Zhou, Z., Datta, A., Gligor, V., and Perrig, A. TrustVisor: Efficient TCB reduction and attestation. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2010 (2010), IEEE, pp. 143--158. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  39. McCune, J. M., Parno, B., Perrig, A., Reiter, M. K., and Seshadri, A. How low can you go?: Recommendations for hardware-supported minimal TCB code execution. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 42, 2 (Mar. 2008), 14--25. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  40. McCune, J. M., Parno, B. J., Perrig, A., Reiter, M. K., and Isozaki, H. Flicker: An execution infrastructure for TCB minimization. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 42, 4 (Apr. 2008), 315--328. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  41. McQuarrie, L., Mehra, A., Mishra, S., Randolph, K., and Rogers, B. Inside Adobe Reader Protected Mode - part 1 - design. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2010/10/inside-adobe-reader-protected-mode-part-1-design.html, Oct. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  42. McQuarrie, L., Mehra, A., Mishra, S., Randolph, K., and Rogers, B. Inside adobe reader protected mode - part 2 - the sandbox process. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2010/10/inside-adobe-reader-protected-mode-%E2%80%93-part-2-%E2%80%93-the-sandbox-process.html, Oct. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  43. McQuarrie, L., Mehra, A., Mishra, S., Randolph, K., and Rogers, B. Inside adobe reader protected mode - part 3 - broker process, policies, and inter-process communication. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2010/11/inside-adobe-reader-protected-mode-part-3-broker-process-policies-and-inter-process-communication.html, Nov. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  44. Michael Howard, and Steve Lipner. The Security Development Lifecycle. Microsoft Press, May 2006. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  45. Nedim Srndic, and Pavel Laskov. Detection of malicious PDF files based on hierarchical document structure. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (2013).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  46. Obes, J., and Schuh, J. Chromium blog: A tale of two pwnies (Part 1). http://blog.chromium.org/2012/05/tale-of-two-pwnies-part-1.html, May 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  47. Sabanal, P., and Yason, M. Playing in the Reader X sandbox. Black Hat USA Briefings (July 2011).Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  48. Schuh, J. Chromium blog: The road to safer, more stable, and flashier flash. http://blog.chromium.org/2012/08/the-road-to-safer-more-stable-and.html, Aug. 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  49. Sewell, P., and Vitek, J. Secure composition of insecure components. In Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 1999. (1999), IEEE, pp. 136--150. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  50. Singaravelu, L., Pu, C., Hartig, H., and Helmuth, C. Reducing TCB complexity for security-sensitive applications: three case studies. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 40, 4 (Apr. 2006), 161--174. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  51. Smutz, C., and Stavrou, A. Malicious PDF detection using metadata and structural features. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (New York, NY, USA, 2012), ACSAC '12, ACM, pp. 239--248. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  52. Stender, S. Inside adobe reader protected mode - part 4 - the challenge of sandboxing. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2010/11/inside-adobe-reader-protected-mode-part-4-the-challenge-of-sandboxing.html, Nov. 2010.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  53. Stiegler, M., Karp, A. H., Yee, K.-P., Close, T., and Miller, M. S. Polaris: Virus-safe computing for windows XP. Commun. ACM 49, 9 (Sept. 2006), 83--88. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  54. Tzermias, Z., Sykiotakis, G., Polychronakis, M., and Markatos, E. P. Combining static and dynamic analysis for the detection of malicious documents. In Proceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on System Security (New York, NY, USA, 2011), EUROSEC '11, ACM, pp. 4:1--4:6. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  55. Uhley, P., and Gwalani, R. Inside flash player protected mode for firefox. http://blogs.adobe.com/asset/2012/06/inside-flash-player-protected-mode-for-firefox.html, June 2012.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
  56. Wahbe, R., Lucco, S., Anderson, T. E., and Graham, S. L. Efficient software-based fault isolation. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 27, 5 (Dec. 1993), 203--216. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library
  57. Yee, B., Sehr, D., Dardyk, G., Chen, J. B., Muth, R., Ormandy, T., Okasaka, S., Narula, N., and Fullagar, N. Native client: a sandbox for portable, untrusted x86 native code. Commun. ACM 53, 1 (Jan. 2010), 91--99. Google ScholarGoogle ScholarDigital LibraryDigital Library

Index Terms

  1. In-nimbo sandboxing

      Recommendations

      Comments

      Login options

      Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

      Sign in
      • Published in

        cover image ACM Other conferences
        HotSoS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 Symposium and Bootcamp on the Science of Security
        April 2014
        184 pages
        ISBN:9781450329071
        DOI:10.1145/2600176

        Copyright © 2014 ACM

        Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

        Publisher

        Association for Computing Machinery

        New York, NY, United States

        Publication History

        • Published: 8 April 2014

        Permissions

        Request permissions about this article.

        Request Permissions

        Check for updates

        Qualifiers

        • research-article

        Acceptance Rates

        HotSoS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate12of21submissions,57%Overall Acceptance Rate34of60submissions,57%

      PDF Format

      View or Download as a PDF file.

      PDF

      eReader

      View online with eReader.

      eReader