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LineSwitch: Efficiently Managing Switch Flow in Software-Defined Networking while Effectively Tackling DoS Attacks

Published:14 April 2015Publication History

ABSTRACT

Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking architecture that aims to provide better decoupling between network control (control plane) and data forwarding functionalities (data plane). This separation introduces several benefits, such as a directly programmable and (virtually) centralized network control. However, researchers showed that the required communication channel between the control and data plane of SDN creates a potential bottleneck in the system, introducing new vulnerabilities.Indeed, this behavior could be exploited to mount powerful attacks, such as the control plane saturation attack, that can severely hinder the performance of the whole network.

In this paper we present LineSwitch, an efficient and effective solution against control plane saturation attack. LineSwitch combines SYN proxy techniques and probabilistic blacklisting of network traffic. We implemented LineSwitch as an extension of OpenFlow, the current reference implementation of SDN, and evaluate our solution considering different traffic scenarios (with and without attack). The results of our preliminary experiments confirm that, compared to the state-of-the-art, LineSwitch reduces the time overhead up to 30%, while ensuring the same level of protection.

References

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  1. LineSwitch: Efficiently Managing Switch Flow in Software-Defined Networking while Effectively Tackling DoS Attacks

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      ASIA CCS '15: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
      April 2015
      698 pages
      ISBN:9781450332453
      DOI:10.1145/2714576

      Copyright © 2015 ACM

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      • Published: 14 April 2015

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      Acceptance Rates

      ASIA CCS '15 Paper Acceptance Rate48of269submissions,18%Overall Acceptance Rate418of2,322submissions,18%

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