Yue Fan
ABSTRACT
Stimulating user participation is of paramount importance for mobile crowdsensing applications to obtain high-quality data. Although many incentive mechanisms have been designed, most of them ignore the dynamic arrivals and different sensing requirements of tasks. Thus, the existing mechanisms will fail when being applied to the realistic scenario where tasks are publicized dynamically and heterogeneous with different sensing requirements of locations, time durations and sensing times. In this work, we propose an auction-based truthful mechanism for realistic mobile crowdsensing. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that our mechanism can satisfy the desired properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, computational efficiency with both low social cost and low total payment.
- Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Xi Fang, and Jian Tang. Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In The 18th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, Mobicom'12, Istanbul, Turkey, August 22-26, 2012, pages 173--184, 2012. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Zhenni Feng, Yanmin Zhu, Qian Zhang, Lionel M. Ni, and Athanasios V. Vasilakos. TRAC: truthful auction for location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowdsourcing. In 2014 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2014, Toronto, Canada, April 27 - May 2, 2014, pages 1231--1239, 2014.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Dong Zhao, Xiang-Yang Li, and Huadong Ma. How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint. In 2014 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2014, Toronto, Canada, April 27 - May 2, 2014, pages 1213--1221, 2014.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Yanmin Zhu, Qian Zhang, Hongzi Zhu, Jiadi Yu, Jian Cao, and Lionel M. Ni. Towards truthful mechanisms for mobile crowdsourcing with dynamic smartphones. In IEEE 34th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2014, Madrid, Spain, June 30 - July 3, 2014, pages 11--20, 2014. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Yue Fan, Hailong Sun, Yanmin Zhu, Xudong Liu, and Ji Yuan. A truthful online auction for tempo-spatial crowdsourcing tasks. In 2015 IEEE Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering, SOSE 2015, San Francisco Bay, USA, March 30 - April 3, 2015.Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Poster: TRIM: A Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Dynamic and Heterogeneous Tasks in Mobile Crowdsensing
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