Wilhelm E. J. Klein
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Abstract
This paper revisits major revolutions in human self-perception, and pursues their insights to their logical conclusions, using robots as conceptual archetypes for fully naturalistic, talking, walking and thinking agents. Doing so, humans are reconsidered as bio-bots and ontologically not of significant difference from techno-bots; morality is stripped of metaphysical remnants of the past and updated to a preference-utilitarian morality2, and moral agency re-examined in light of a determinism and the non-existence of free will. Taken together, this robot-catalysed level of philosophical honesty provides a sound foundation for the task of making robots ethical.
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Index Terms
- Robots make ethics honest: and vice versa
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