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An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage
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Source Journal of the ACM (JACM) archive
Volume 34 ,  Issue 3  (July 1987) table of contents
Pages: 532 - 543  
Year of Publication: 1987
ISSN:0004-5411
Authors
Robert W. Irving  Univ. of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland
Paul Leather  Salford College of Technology, Salford, UK
Dan Gusfield  Yale Univ., New Haven, CT
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 30,   Downloads (12 Months): 202,   Citation Count: 8
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ABSTRACT

In an instance of size n of the stable marriage problem, each of n men and n women ranks the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable matching is a complete matching of men and women such that no man and woman who are not partners both prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. It is well known [2] that at least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance. However, the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm produces a marriage that greatly favors the men at the expense of the women, or vice versa. The problem arises of finding a stable matching that is optimal under some more equitable or egalitarian criterion of optimality. This problem was posed by Knuth [6] and has remained unsolved for some time. Here, the objective of maximizing the average (or, equivalently, the total) “satisfaction” of all people is used. This objective is achieved when a person's satisfaction is measured by the position of his/her partner in his/her preference list. By exploiting the structure of the set of all stable matchings, and using graph-theoretic methods, an O(n4) algorithm for this problem is derived.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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GALE, D., AND SHAPELY, L. S. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am. Math. Monthly 69 (1962), 9-15.
 
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IRVING, R.W. An efficient algorithm for the "stable room-mates" problem. J. Algorithms 6 (1985), 577-595.
 
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KNUTH, D. E. Mariages Stables. Les Presses de l'Universit6 de Montr6al, Montr6al, Quebec, Canada 1976.
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PICARD, J. Maximum closure of a graph and applications to combinatorial problems. Manage. Sci. 22 (1976), 1268-1272.
 
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PICARD, J., AND QUEYRANNE, M. Selected applications of minimum cuts in networks, INFOR-- Can. J. Oper. Res. Inf. Process. 20 (1982), 394-422.
 
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POLYA, G., TARJAN, R. E., AND WOODS, D.R. Notes on Introductory Combinatorics. Birkhauser Vedag, Boston, Mass., 1983.
 
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RHYS, J. A selection problem of shared fixed costs and network flows. Manage. Sci. 17 (1970), 200-207.
 
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CITED BY  8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


REVIEW

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The stable marriage problem is the following: each of n women and n men ranks the members of the opposite sex in order of preference. A stable matching is a perfect matching in which no man and woman who are not matched bot  more...

Collaborative Colleagues:
Robert W. Irving: colleagues
Paul Leather: colleagues
Dan Gusfield: colleagues

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