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Analyzing the Effectiveness of Attack Countermeasures in a SCADA System

Published:18 April 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

The SCADA infrastructure is a key component for power grid operations. Securing the SCADA infrastructure against cyber intrusions is thus vital for a well-functioning power grid. However, the task remains a particular challenge, not the least since not all available security mechanisms are easily deployable in these reliability-critical and complex, multi-vendor environments that host modern systems alongside legacy ones, to support a range of sensitive power grid operations. This paper examines how effective a few countermeasures are likely to be in SCADA environments, including those that are commonly considered out of bounds. The results show that granular network segmentation is a particularly effective countermeasure, followed by frequent patching of systems (which is unfortunately still difficult to date). The results also show that the enforcement of a password policy and restrictive network configuration including whitelisting of devices contributes to increased security, though best in combination with granular network segmentation.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    CPSR-SG'17: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids
    April 2017
    78 pages
    ISBN:9781450349789
    DOI:10.1145/3055386

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    Publication History

    • Published: 18 April 2017

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