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Integrated Multi-Domain Risk Assessment Using Automated Hypothesis Testing

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Published:18 April 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

In this paper we present an approach for the integration of cybersecurity tools from multiple domains into an overall risk assessment framework which takes the complex interactions between domains in smart grid systems into account. The approach is based on generating hypotheses from a template, which are then analyzed for their probability and associated impact on the system. The feasibility of the proposed approach is discussed using a very simple example case to serve as a proof of concept. Furthermore, we introduce a generic software framework for the processing of hypothesis templates.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    CPSR-SG'17: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids
    April 2017
    78 pages
    ISBN:9781450349789
    DOI:10.1145/3055386

    Copyright © 2017 ACM

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    Publication History

    • Published: 18 April 2017

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