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Investigation of the 2016 Linux TCP Stack Vulnerability at Scale

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Published:05 June 2017Publication History
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Abstract

To combat blind in-window attacks against TCP, changes proposed in RFC 5961 have been implemented by Linux since late 2012. While successfully eliminating the old vulnerabilities, the new TCP implementation was reported in August 2016 to have introduced a subtle yet serious security flaw. Assigned CVE-2016-5696, the flaw exploits the challenge ACK rate limiting feature that could allow an off-path attacker to infer the presence/absence of a TCP connection between two arbitrary hosts, terminate such a connection, and even inject malicious payload. In this work, we perform a comprehensive measurement of the impact of the new vulnerability. This includes (1) tracking the vulnerable Internet servers, (2) monitoring the patch behavior over time, (3) picturing the overall security status of TCP stacks at scale. Towards this goal, we design a scalable measurement methodology to scan the Alexa top 1 million websites for almost 6 months. We also present how notifications impact the patching behavior, and compare the result with the Heartbleed and the Debian PRNG vulnerability. The measurement represents a valuable data point in understanding how Internet servers react to serious security flaws in the operating system kernel.

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            • Published in

              cover image ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
              ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review  Volume 45, Issue 1
              Performance evaluation review
              June 2017
              70 pages
              ISSN:0163-5999
              DOI:10.1145/3143314
              Issue’s Table of Contents
              • cover image ACM Conferences
                SIGMETRICS '17 Abstracts: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGMETRICS / International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems
                June 2017
                84 pages
                ISBN:9781450350327
                DOI:10.1145/3078505

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              • Published: 5 June 2017

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