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SAFES: Sand-boxed Architecture for Frequent Environment Self-measurement

Published:15 January 2018Publication History

ABSTRACT

Monitoring software of low-end devices is a key part of defense in depth for IoT systems. These devices are particularly susceptible to memory corruption vulnerabilities because the limited computational resources restrict the types of countermeasures that can be implemented. Run-time monitoring therefore is fundamental for the security of these devices. We propose a monitoring architecture for untrusted software at the I/O event granularity for TrustZone-enabled devices. The architecture enables us to measure the integrity of the code immediately before its execution is triggered by any input. To verify the integrity in a lightweight manner, we statically determine the minimal code region that needs to be measured based on the I/O operation. We develop a prototype of the architecture using TrustZone-M and demonstrate that our prototype has a low processing overhead and small ROM memory footprint.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    SysTEX '18: Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution
    October 2018
    59 pages
    ISBN:9781450359986
    DOI:10.1145/3268935

    Copyright © 2018 ACM

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    Publication History

    • Published: 15 January 2018

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