| Lower bounds for collusion-secure fingerprinting |
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Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
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Baltimore, Maryland
SESSION: Session 7C
table of contents
Pages: 472 - 479
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:0-89871-538-5
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Authors
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Chris Peikert
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MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
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Abhi shelat
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MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
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Adam Smith
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MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
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Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Philadelphia, PA, USA
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| Bibliometrics |
Downloads (6 Weeks): 2, Downloads (12 Months): 39, Citation Count: 3
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ABSTRACT
Collusion-secure fingerprinting codes are an important primitive used by many digital watermarking schemes [1, 10, 9]. Boneh and Shaw [3] define a model for these types of codes and present an explicit construction. Their code has length O(c3 log(l/ε)) and attains security against coalitions of size c with ε error. Boneh and Shaw also present a lower bound of Ω (c3log(1/cε)) on the length of any collusion-secure code.We give new lower bounds on the length of collusion-secure codes by analyzing a weighted coinflipping strategy for the coalition. As an illustration of our methods, we give a simple proof that the Boneh-Shaw construction cannot be asymptotically improved. Next, we prove a general lower bound: no secure code can have length O(c21og(1/cε)), which improves the previous known bound by a factor of c. In particular, we show that any secure code will have length Ω(c2 log(1/cε)) as long as log(l/ε) ≥ K k log c, where K is a constant and k is the number of columns in the code (in some sense, a measure of the code's complexity). Finally, we describe a general paradigm for constructing fingerprinting codes which encompasses the construction of [3], and show that no secure code that follows this paradigm can have length O((c3/log c) log(1/cε)) follows this (again, by showing a lower bound for large values of ln(1/ε)). This suggests that any attempts at improvement should be directed toward techniques that lie outside our paradigm.
REFERENCES
Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.
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B. Bollobás. Combinatorics. Cambridge University Press, 1986.
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D. Boneh and J. Shaw. "Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol IT-44, Sep. 1998, pp. 1897--1905.
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Joe Kilian, F. Thomson Leighton, Lesley R. Matheson, Talal G. Shamoon, Robert E. Tarjan, and Francis Zane. "Resistance of digital fingerprints to collusional attacks." Proceedings of 1998 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. Cambridge, MA, 16--21 August 1998, p. 271.
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Tina Lindkvist. "Fingerprinting of digital documents," Dissertation No 706, Linköping University, September 2001.
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B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. 'Anonymous fingerprinting." In Walter Fumy, editor, Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT'97, LNCS 1233, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997, pp. 88--102.
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