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Lower bounds for collusion-secure fingerprinting
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Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms table of contents
Baltimore, Maryland
SESSION: Session 7C table of contents
Pages: 472 - 479  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:0-89871-538-5
Authors
Chris Peikert  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Abhi shelat  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Adam Smith  MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA
Sponsors
: SIAM Activity Group on Discrete Mathematics
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
Publisher
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics  Philadelphia, PA, USA
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ABSTRACT

Collusion-secure fingerprinting codes are an important primitive used by many digital watermarking schemes [1, 10, 9]. Boneh and Shaw [3] define a model for these types of codes and present an explicit construction. Their code has length O(c3 log(l/ε)) and attains security against coalitions of size c with ε error. Boneh and Shaw also present a lower bound of Ω (c3log(1/cε)) on the length of any collusion-secure code.We give new lower bounds on the length of collusion-secure codes by analyzing a weighted coinflipping strategy for the coalition. As an illustration of our methods, we give a simple proof that the Boneh-Shaw construction cannot be asymptotically improved. Next, we prove a general lower bound: no secure code can have length O(c21og(1/cε)), which improves the previous known bound by a factor of c. In particular, we show that any secure code will have length Ω(c2 log(1/cε)) as long as log(l/ε) ≥ K k log c, where K is a constant and k is the number of columns in the code (in some sense, a measure of the code's complexity). Finally, we describe a general paradigm for constructing fingerprinting codes which encompasses the construction of [3], and show that no secure code that follows this paradigm can have length O((c3/log c) log(1/cε)) follows this (again, by showing a lower bound for large values of ln(1/ε)). This suggests that any attempts at improvement should be directed toward techniques that lie outside our paradigm.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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B. Bollobás. Combinatorics. Cambridge University Press, 1986.
 
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D. Boneh and J. Shaw. "Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol IT-44, Sep. 1998, pp. 1897--1905.
 
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Joe Kilian, F. Thomson Leighton, Lesley R. Matheson, Talal G. Shamoon, Robert E. Tarjan, and Francis Zane. "Resistance of digital fingerprints to collusional attacks." Proceedings of 1998 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. Cambridge, MA, 16--21 August 1998, p. 271.
 
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Tina Lindkvist. "Fingerprinting of digital documents," Dissertation No 706, Linköping University, September 2001.
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B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. 'Anonymous fingerprinting." In Walter Fumy, editor, Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT'97, LNCS 1233, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1997, pp. 88--102.
 
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Collaborative Colleagues:
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Abhi shelat: colleagues
Adam Smith: colleagues

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