James W. Cerny
ABSTRACT
There are many ways to deliver academic and administrative computer services. Some imply competition and some imply cooperation. It is useful to discuss and analyze these situations in game-theory terms. To illustrate such an analysis, data from the University of New Hampshire are used.
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Digital Library
- 2.Stevens, D. F., 1980, "Obfuscatory Measurement: The State of the Art," Computerworld, v. 14, n. 20, May 19, pp. indepth/14-indepth/20.Google Scholar
- 3.Rapoport, A., 1970, N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
- 4.Rapoport, A., 1962, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," Scientific American, v. 207, n. 6, pp. 108-118.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Academic and administrative computing as zero- and nonzero-sum games
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