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Simulating realistic network worm traffic for worm warning system design and testing
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Source Workshop on Rapid Malcode archive
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode table of contents
Washington, DC, USA
SESSION: Network interactions table of contents
Pages: 24 - 33  
Year of Publication: 2003
ISBN:1-58113-785-0
Authors
Michael Liljenstam  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
David M. Nicol  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Vincent H. Berk  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Robert S. Gray  Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH
Sponsors
SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 4,   Downloads (12 Months): 103,   Citation Count: 17
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ABSTRACT

Reproducing the effects of large-scale worm attacks in a laboratory setup in a realistic and reproducible manner is an important issue for the development of worm detection and defense systems. In this paper, we describe a worm simulation model we are developing to accurately model the large-scale spread dynamics of a worm and many aspects of its detailed effects on the network. We can model slow or fast worms with realistic scan rates on realistic IP address spaces and selectively model local detailed network behavior. We show how it can be used to generate realistic input traffic for a working prototype worm detection and tracking system, the Dartmouth ICMP BCC: System/Tracking and Fusion Engine (DIB:S/TRAFEN), allowing performance evaluation of the system under realistic conditions. Thus, we can answer important design questions relating to necessary detector coverage and noise filtering without deploying and operating a full system. Our experiments indicate that the tracking algorithms currently implemented in the DIB:S/TRAFEN system could detect attacks such as Code Red v2 and Sapphire/Slammer very early, even when monitoring a quite limited portion of the address space, but more sophisticated algorithms are being constructed to reduce the risk of false positives in the presence of significant "background noise" scanning.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Michael Liljenstam: colleagues
David M. Nicol: colleagues
Vincent H. Berk: colleagues
Robert S. Gray: colleagues

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