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Abstract non-interference: parameterizing non-interference by abstract interpretation
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Source Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages archive
Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages table of contents
Venice, Italy
Pages: 186 - 197  
Year of Publication: 2004
ISBN:1-58113-729-X
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Authors
Roberto Giacobazzi  Università di Verona, Verona, Italy
Isabella Mastroeni  Università di Verona, Verona, Italy
Sponsors
SIGACT: ACM Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
ACM: Association for Computing Machinery
SIGPLAN: ACM Special Interest Group on Programming Languages
Publisher
ACM  New York, NY, USA
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Downloads (6 Weeks): 5,   Downloads (12 Months): 62,   Citation Count: 10
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ABSTRACT

In this paper we generalize the notion of non-interference making it parametric relatively to what an attacker can analyze about the input/output information flow. The idea is to consider attackers as data-flow analyzers, whose task is to reveal properties of confidential resources by analyzing public ones. This means that no unauthorized flow of information is possible from confidential to public data, relatively to the degree of precision of an attacker. We prove that this notion can be fully specified in standard abstract interpretation framework, making the degree of security of a program a property of its semantics. This provides a comprehensive account of non-interference features for language-based security. We introduce systematic methods for extracting attackers from programs, providing domain-theoretic characterizations of the most precise attackers which cannot violate the security of a given program. These methods allow us both to compare attackers and program secrecy by comparing the corresponding abstractions in the lattice of abstract interpretations, and to design automatic program certification tools for language-based security by abstract interpretation.


REFERENCES

Note: OCR errors may be found in this Reference List extracted from the full text article. ACM has opted to expose the complete List rather than only correct and linked references.

 
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CITED BY  10
 
 
 
 

Collaborative Colleagues:
Roberto Giacobazzi: colleagues
Isabella Mastroeni: colleagues

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