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A decentralized model for multi-attribute negotiations

Published:13 August 2006Publication History

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a decentralized model that allows self-interested agents to reach "win-win" agreements in a multi-attribute negotiation. The model is based on an alternating-offer protocol. In each period, the proposing agent is allowed to make a limited number of offers. The responding agent can choose the best offer or reject all of them. In the case of rejection, agents exchange their roles and the negotiation proceeds to the next period. To make counteroffers, an agent first uses the heuristic of choosing, on an indifference curve (or surface), the offer that is closest to the best offer made by the opponent in the previous period, and then taking this offer as the seed, chooses several other offers randomly in a specified neighborhood of this seed offer. Experimental results show that this model can make agents reach near Pareto optimal agreements in general situations where agents have complex preferences on the attributes and incomplete information. Moreover, different from other solutions for multi-attribute negotiations, this model does not require the presence of a mediator.

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        cover image ACM Other conferences
        ICEC '06: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
        August 2006
        624 pages
        ISBN:1595933921
        DOI:10.1145/1151454

        Copyright © 2006 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 13 August 2006

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        ICEC '06 Paper Acceptance Rate53of112submissions,47%Overall Acceptance Rate150of244submissions,61%

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